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The twentieth century has witnessed a fundamental change in the ability
of society to alter the shape of the natural environment. Through the use
of modem technology, we can dam vast rivers, tap the power of the atom,
and, literally, make the desert bloom. In the United States, the role of the
federal government has loomed large in transforming the environment
through the application of technology. The federal government has built,
funded, or approved innumerable projects designed to improve the economic
well-being of the nation. Until 1970, however, these projects were often
undertaken with little or no consideration of their possible detrimental
effects upon the environment.1
Frustrated by the insensitivity of many federal agencies to the environ-
mental consequences of their actions, Congress enacted the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 2 The text of NEPA is remarkably
brief, and its language extremely general. Nevertheless, NEPA represented
an unprecedented attempt to protect the human environment by broadly
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1. See generally L. CALDwE.L, SCIENCE AND THE NATIONAL ENviRoNmENTAL POLICY ACT:
REDIRECTING POLICY THROUGH PROCEDURAL REFORM 6-9, 41-46 (1982) (recounting how federal
agencies-especially those concerned with natural resources, land use, and transportation-had
reshaped the nation's landscape during the two decades following the Second World War);
Tarlock, Balancing Environmental Considerations and Energy Demands: A Comment on
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 645, 658 (1972) (stating
that mission-oriented federal agencies had tended to overemphasize the developmental benefits
of their particular programs to the detriment of the environment).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4347 (1982)) [hereinafter NEPA]. One can say, without exaggeration, that the "modem era"
of environmental law began with the signing of NEPA by President Nixon on New Year's
Day 1970. See J. BoNINE & T. McGAEITy, THE LAW OF ENmVO NmENTAL PROTECTION 2 (1984);
see also COUNCIL ON ENvrl. QuALITY, TENTH ANN. REp. 1, 15 (1979) (stating that the
"environmental decade" of the 1970s began with the enactment of NEPA).
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injecting environmental concerns into the calculus of federal decisionmaking.
The Act begins with an elaborate declaration of national policy with
respect to the environment. 3 Congress prescribed, in short, that "it is the
continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable
means . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony .... ,4 Congress recognized, however, that
a lofty pronouncement of national policy, no matter how eloquent, would
have little impact upon the priorities of mission-oriented agencies without
additional action-forcing features.' Consequently, NEPA sets forth a number
of instructions to the federal government, all of which are designed to
assure the implementation of this policy in federal planning and decision-
making.
These action-forcing instructions both authorize and mandate federal
agencies to consider environmental matters just as they would any other
matter within their programmatic authority. 6 Congress accomplished this by
requiring in section 102 that the federal government comply "to the fullest
extent possible" with a new substantive mandate and an innovative proce-
dural device. 7 First, Congress directed all federal agencies to apply their
policies and the laws and regulations they administer in accordance with
the broad national policy enunciated by NEPA.8 Thus, the Act's policy is
not merely hortatory; it is intended to be implemented. 9 In addition, the
3. See F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1037 (3d ed. 1985).
4. NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982). Congress expanded upon this primary
policy in § 101(b) where it set forth six specific objectives for this legislation. Among these
objectives are the assurance of safe and healthful surroundings, id. § 101(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. §
4331(b)(2); the attainment of a wide range of "beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences," id.
§ 101(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3); and the preservation of important historic and natural
resources, id. § 101(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4).
5. As Professor Lynton Caldwell so aptly wrote: "Exhortation has seldom been an effective
instrument of political or moral reform." L. CALDwEU., supra note 1, at 51.
6. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
7. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). The purpose of the phrase "to the fullest
extent possible" was to make clear that every federal agency must comply with the directives
of § 102 unless some existing law either prohibits compliance or renders full compliance
impossible. H.R. CoNF. RP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969) [hereinafter CONFERENCE
REPORT ON NEPA]. See also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., 449 F.2d at 1114 (declaring
that these words set a "high standard for the agencies, a standard which must be rigorously
enforced by the reviewing courts").
8. NEPA § 102(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (1982). This new mandate, of course, did not
displace the preexisting responsibilities possessed by federal agencies; rather, it was meant to
supplement those responsibilities. Id. § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 4335. See also id. § 102, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332 (tempering this environmental directive with the phrase "to the fullest extent possible").
9. Congress was keenly aware that many agencies had argued that they lacked the statutory
authority to concern themselves with the harmful environmental effects of their actions. See
S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT ON NEPAl.
NEPA, consequently, was consciously crafted to expand the mandates of federal agencies to
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Act contains a procedural mechanism designed to translate its policy into
action. All federal agencies are required to prepare "a detailed statement"
on proposals for major federal actions "significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment."' 1 Such an environmental impact statement
(EIS) must address the environmental ramifications of the proposed federal
action and any alternatives to that action." The EIS requirement has become
the linchpin of the NEPA process.' 2 Through their preparation, federal
agencies are expected to examine the harmful consequences that their major
decisions may have on the quality of the environment. Moreover, the EIS
serves as evidence of whether an agency has actually taken a hard look at
the environmental implications of a proposed action during the planning
process. 3 Thus, the EIS is the procedural device that seeks to ensure that
the ambitious goals of NEPA do not wither at the hands of administrative
hostility or passivity.
The effectiveness of this procedure is enhanced by the creation of several
institutional arrangements which serve to reinforce the desired reorientation
in federal decisionmaking. NEPA created a Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) in the Executive Office of the President to oversee the
implementation of the Act. 14 Among its functions is the duty to review
federal activities in light of the national policy enunciated in NEPA.'5 NEPA
also created another external check upon the rather natural inclination of
federal agencies to elevate their primary missions above any environmental
considerations. 6 The Act requires that agencies preparing an EIS must
"obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law
or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved."' 7
encompass environmental values. See id. at 19-20 ("To remedy present shortcomings in the
legislative foundation of existing programs, and to establish action-forcing procedures which
will help to insure that the policies enunciated in section 101 are implemented, section 102
authorizes and directs that the existing body of Federal law, regulation, and policy be interpreted
and administered to the fullest extent possible in accordance with the policies set forth in this
act."). In short, NEPA placed "an environmental overlay" upon the specific statutory missions
of the federal government. D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAw AND LrrIIATON § 1:01, at 2 (1984).
10. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
11. Id. The statute provides that the EIS must contain a discussion of the following five
points: the proposal's impact upon the environment, any unavoidable adverse impacts, alter-
natives to the proposal, the trade-off between short-term uses of the environment and long-
term productivity, and any irretrievable commitments of resources necessitated by the imple-
mentation of the proposal. Id.
12. See, e.g., D. MANDELR, supra note 9, § 1:01, at 2.
13. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., 449 F.2d at 1114.
14. NEPA § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1982).
15. Id. § 204(3), 42 U.S.C. § 4344(3) (1982). See also H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. 9-10 (1969) (stating that one responsibility of CEQ is to maintain "a constant review"
of federal programs to determine whether they are consistent with NEPA) [hereinafter HousE
REPORT ON NEPA].
16. See 115 CoNo. REc. 29,053 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
17. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). These comments together with the
EIS must be made available to CEQ and the public. Id.
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Not long after the enactment of NEPA, Congress acted to amplify
executive branch oversight. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 197018
specifically order the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to review and comment upon the environmental implications of any major
federal action subject to the required preparation of an EIS. 19 In addition,
EPA is directed "to raise the red flag" in the event an action is found to
pose an unacceptable risk of environmental harm.20 Whenever EPA finds
that any such action "is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of public health
or welfare or environmental quality," the agency must refer the matter to
CEQ. 21 This supervisory authority is thus quite expansive. It extends beyond
the merits of a particular impact statement to encompass the environmental
merits of the project itself.
The task of ensuring the implementation of NEPA, however, has not
been left entirely in the hands of the executive branch. Although NEPA
does not expressly address the role of judicial review, the federal courts
have become the prime enforcer of the impact statement process. 22 This
came about for a number of reasons. During the early years of NEPA,
citizens presented the federal courts with many cases which revealed grudg-
ing, half-hearted compliance by some federal agencies. 23 The courts reacted
by strictly enforcing the procedural aspects of NEPA24 in order "to see that
important legislative purposes . . .are not lost or misdirected in the vast
hallways of the federal bureaucracy. '" 21 Furthermore, the vague language of
NEPA gave the federal courts the opportunity to create an expansive
18. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7642 (1982)) [hereinafter Clean Air Act].
19. Clean Air Act § 309(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (1982).
20. See Nomination of William D. Ruckelshaus: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1970) [hereinafter Ruckelshaus Confirmation Hearings].
The sparse legislative history on § 309 is greatly amplified by discussions concerning it that
Senator Muskie had with William Ruckelshaus during the latter's confirmation hearings as the
Administrator of EPA. These discussions took place prior to the final passage of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970 and were specifically alluded to by Senator Muskie during the
Senate consideration of the conference report on the 1970 amendments. See 116 CONG. REC.
42,386 (1970), reprinted in 1 LEOIsLATivE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AR AMENDMENTs 1970, at
136 (1974) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVa HISTORY 1970].
21. Clean Air Act § 309(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7609(b) (1982).
22. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE CouRTs: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL
ENvrRoNmENTAL PoLIcY ACT 15 (1973) [hereinafter NEPA IN THE CoURTs]; D. MANDELKER,
supra note 9, §§ 1:05, at 8-11, 3:01, at 1; E. REMINDER & R. STEWART, ENVmomNTrrAL
PROTECTION POLICY 134 (1985).
23. See Comment, The National Environmental Policy Act: How It Is Working, How It
Should Work, 4 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,003 (1974).
24. See R. Lmoss, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENviRONMENT: NEPA AND hs AFTERMATH
186-87 (1976); Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 238, 412 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974); Goldsmith & Banks, Environmental Values:
Institutional Responsibility and the Supreme Court, 7 HARv. ENvmL. L. Rav. 1, 4 (1983);
Comment supra note 23, at 10,003.
25. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., 449 F.2d at 1111.
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common law that demands the rigorous exploration of environmental issues
during the impact statement process. 6
Judicial scrutiny, however, does not extend to the substantive merits of
an agency's decision. Assuming, therefore, that an agency has examined the
environmental consequences of its proposed action fully, the courts will not
second-guess an agency's eventual decision even if the decision is to proceed
with an environmentally unsatisfactory project.27 This judicial reluctance to
engage in substantive review of federal decisionmaking appears appropriate
since NEPA's general statement of policy provides precious little "law" to
apply. 28 Moreover, the resolution of any conflict among various national
policies-only one of which is presented by NEPA-is not truly amenable
to judicial review. Nevertheless, NEPA was meant to change the manner in
which mission-oriented federal agencies behave. And, despite all of the
resources devoted to the EIS process itself,29 the EIS remains only a means
to achieve that desideratum? 0
If the focus of NEPA compliance is confined to the impact statement
process itself, the ultimate goal of the Act-namely, better decisions-could
atrophy. The EIS process could devolve into a paperwork production process
having little substantive effect. Somehow the information produced by an
EIS must be used and relied upon in the ultimate decision produced by the
agency. Just as certainly, however, the federal courts will not, perhaps
should not, supervise that complicated balancing process. The only branch
of government, therefore, that has both the ability and the authority to
consistently oversee the substantive implementation of NEPA is the execu-
tive.3'
26. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); R. Lmorr, supra note 24, at 187; D. M"qDOELKR, supra note 9, &
1:05; E. RE INDER & R. STwART, supra note 22, at 54, 135; Goldsmith & Banks, supra
note 24, at 3-4.
27. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980)
(per curiam); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (stating that NEPA is designed "to insure a fully
informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily a decision the judges of the Court of
Appeals or of this Court would have reached .... ").
28. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that agency decisions are unreviewable to
the extent that the action "is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
(1982). According to the Supreme Court, this precludes review "in those rare instances where
'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply."'
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. REP.
No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)).
29. See, e.g., J. BATTLE, EvmotmErrrAL DECISIONIN.Go ANcD NEPA 114 (1986).
30. See L. CAXVDwELL, supra note 1, at 6.
31. Congress, of course, has the power to monitor NEPA compliance through oversight
and appropriation hearings. While congressional pressure can be considerable in specific
instances, Congress clearly lacks the wherewithal to give regular and detailed attention to the
wide range of executive actions subject to the requirements of NEPA.
1989]
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Executive branch oversight, however, has generally been limited to the
impact statement phase of the NEPA process. Although EPA and com-
menting federal agencies may refer proposals involving possible unsatisfac-
tory environmental effects to CEQ,32 such referrals must be made before a
federal agency actually makes its substantive decision.3 Consequently, all
referrals involve the merits or demerits of an impact statement and the
proposal as described in it. The missing link is that the agency which
prepared the EIS may or may not actually use that document in framing
its ultimate decision, and the merits of that ultimate decision are shielded
from referral.3 4 Having "considered" the environmental impacts of the
proposal, therefore, an agency can do just about anything it chooses.
The problem of the missing link between what is learned in the NEPA
process and how this information can better inform federal decisionmaking
did attract CEQ's attention when it promulgated regulations implementing
NEPA.15 Those regulations require a decisionmaker to consider the alter-
natives presented in the EIS.36 Furthermore, a decisionmaker must prepare
a public record of decision which states, among other things, whether all
practical measures for avoiding or minimizing environmental harm have
been adopted, and if not, why not.Y Although designed to lead an agency
to water, the decisional process which CEQ imposed upon federal decision-
making amounts to little more than a rhetorical admonition. The federal
courts will not examine the substantive merits of those decisions, 38 and EPA
cannot formally present a dispute about the decision to CEQ. In short,
there is no external check upon what an agency may decide to do once it
complies with the procedural niceties of NEPA.
32. See CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1504.1-1504.3 (1987).
33. Referrals must be delivered to CEQ within 25 days after the final EIS has been made
available to EPA, commenting agencies, and the public. See id. § 1504.3(b). Agency decisions
on a proposed action, on the other hand, may not be made until at least 30 days after the
final EIS has been made available. See CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(b)(2) (1987).
34. The CEQ regulations make no provision for decisional referrals, as opposed to
predecisional referrals. See CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1508.28 (1987). See also
Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regula-
tions, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,036 (1981) (reprinting a memorandum from the General Counsel
of CEQ) (stating in the answer to question 33b that a referral of an interagency disagreement
may not be made after an agency has issued its decision) [hereinafter CEQ Forty Most Asked
Questions].
35. See CEQ: National Environmental Policy Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,979-80 (1978)
[hereinafter Preamble to CEQ Regulations].
36. See CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1505.1(e) (1987).
37. See id. § 1505.2(c). In addition, the record of decision must state what the decision
was, id. § 1505.2(a), and specify which alternative or alternatives were considered to be
environmentally preferable, id. § 1505.2(b).
38. Because the CEQ regulations mandate the preparation of a record of decision, a federal
court might order its preparation in the event an agency ignored its duty. The substantive
content of the decision, however, is another matter altogether.
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Moreover, even if high-level executive oversight were available to ensure
that the EIS more fully informs federal decisionmaking, an additional
problem would remain. The action as set forth in the record of decision
must still be carried out. Perhaps most significant in this regard is the need
to implement those measures adopted in the record of decision that are
designed to mitigate the adverse environmental impacts associated with the
project. The CEQ regulations state that these mitigation measures "shall
be implemented. "3 9 Once again, however, there is no regulatory mechanism
whereby EPA can refer an instance of nonimplementation to CEQ for its
resolution. 40 On the other hand, a federal court could order compliance,
but before such mitigation commitments can be enforced they must find
their way into the decision document itself. Hence, a judicial approach
yields only a partial solution to the problem because any agency that wishes
to avoid a particular form of mitigation can simply omit it from the record
of decision.
This article explores a number of administrative modifications which
would create a more effective link between the impact statement, agency
decisionmaking, and what agencies actually do. Since any such modifications
must conform with congressional intent, the article begins with an explo-
ration of the legislative history of NEPA and section 309 of the Clean Air
Act to more thoroughly establish what Congress intended to achieve through
NEPA and how executive branch oversight was intended to serve those
ends. The article then examines both the limited fashion in which the
executive branch has used its oversight authority and the inability of the
judiciary to adequately ensure the integration of policy and action under
NEPA.
As those sections of the article reveal, the lack of adequate external
supervision appears to contravene congressional expectations. Congress an-
ticipated that agencies, concerned as they are with their own more parochial
interests, would not completely internalize the requirements of NEPA. Thus,
executive branch oversight and occasional high-level intervention were au-
thorized not only to safeguard the EIS process but to ensure that agency
actions reflect the goals of NEPA.
The article argues in its final section for expanded surveillance of the
manner in which NEPA is implemented. This expansion requires that EPA's
watchdog role extend to records of decision and the implementation of the
commitments found in those decisions. Furthermore, to enhance the effect-
iveness of this new role, agencies will have to provide EPA with more
information on their progress in implementing their decisions, including the
39. CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3 (1987); see also CEQ Forty Most Asked
Questions, supra note 34, at 18,037 (stating in the answer to question 34d that agencies must
comply with mitigation measures identified in a record of decision).
40. See CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1508.28 (1987).
19891
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mitigation measures to which they are committed. Armed with these new
tools, EPA would be able for the first time to refer truly "unsatisfactory"
final actions to CEQ, rather than just proposals as presented, perhaps in
unduly flattering terms, in an impact statement.
The eventual success of this structural reform would depend upon the
ability and consistent willingness of both EPA and CEQ to supervise the
back end of the NEPA process. Both agencies would, of course, need
additional resources, more Presidential support, and, not least, the prudence
not to intervene to such an extent that their efforts become counterproduc-
tive. The mere creation of a formal review process should encourage agencies
to take their impact statements and decision documents more seriously so
that the necessity for such intervention would not often arise. When abso-
lutely necessary, however, a mechanism would exist to help ensure that the
executive branch more faithfully adheres to the policy established by NEPA.
I. PUTTING POLICY INTO ACTION: THE LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF
THE NEPA PROCESS
A. 1968: The Momentum Builds
Over the course of the 1960's, Congress gradually became aware of the
need to establish a new national policy which would respond to the contin-
uing deterioration of the environment. 41 This concept gained considerable
force and political respectability during the summer of 1968. At that time,
two reports were issued by Congress that would figure prominently in
influencing the subsequent development of NEPA. 42
In June, the House Committee on Science and Astronautics published a
report 43 which painted an alarming picture of a society in singular pursuit
of economic expansion and technological progress. "A well intentioned but
poorly informed society is haphazardly deploying a powerful, accelerating
technology in a complex and somewhat fragile environment. The conse-
41. See SUBCOmm. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND DEv. TO THE HOUSE Comm. ON SCIENCE
AND ASTRONAUTICS, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., MANAGING TIE ENV'T. 1-3 (Comm. Print 1968)
[hereinafter MANAGING m ENV'T.]; SENATE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note 9, at 11-12; 115
CONG. REc. 29,067 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson); R. LiRoEP, supra note 24, at 14.
42. A number of commentators have addressed the legislative development of NEPA. See,
e.g., NEPA IN THE COURTS, supra note 22, at 1-14; R. ANmDmws, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
AND ADMmSTRATIVE CHANGE 7-19 (1976); F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §
9.01[41 at 28-45 (1987); R. LmoFn, supra note 24, at 10-35; Dreyfus & Ingram, The National
Environmental Policy Act: A View of Intent and Practice, 16 NAT. RESoURCES J. 243 (1976);
Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RuTGERs L. REv. 230 (1970).
43. MANAGING Tm ENV'T., supra note 41.
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quences are only vaguely discernible." 44 Implicit in that description was the
view that important decisions regarding the management of the environment
were being made with little, if any, appreciation of possible environmental
harm. The report thus placed great emphasis upon the need to collect
additional scientific data which would better inform the decisionmaking
process.
45
The report recognized, however, that additional scientific information was
not enough. An overall national policy reflecting environmental values was
required to foster a more balanced, hence wiser, approach to our manage-
ment of the environment." While acknowledging that such an environmental
policy might conflict with the mission-related activities of many federal
agencies, 47 the report assumed that those agencies, armed with better infor-
mation and influenced by congressionally articulated environmental values,
would somehow do the right thing. 4" Despite this rather naive assumption
and its possible technocratic bias, the report did pinpoint the frequent
failure and inability of the federal government to consider the environmental
consequences of its actions.
In July, the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs fueled the
emerging debate by publishing a study entitled "A National Policy for the
Environment. ' 49 The study did not shy away from assessing the impact of
human activity upon the environment. "It is now becoming apparent that
we cannot continue to enjoy the benefits of our productive economy unless
we bring its harmful side effects under control."' 50 In order to obtain this
control, the study concluded that a national policy for the environment was
necessary. 5' This policy, however, "must be principle which can be applied
in action. ' 52
To make such a new policy effective, the study suggested the creation of
a high-level agency within the executive branch which would identify and
analyze various environmental issues.5 3 The new agency would then be
44. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
45. See, e.g., id. at 6 ("If errors in management are to be minimized, a greatly accelerated
search for knowledge of the environment is necessary.").
46. See id. at 5.
47. See id. at 5, 30.
48. See id. at 30.
49. SENATE CoMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSuLAR AFAiIRs, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., A NATIONAL
POLICY FOR THE ENV'T: A SPECIAL REPoRT (Comm. Print 1968) [hereinafter A NAT'L POLICY
FOR THE ENV'T]. This study was prepared by Professor Lynton Cadwell of Indiana University,
id. at IV, and contained an opening statement by Senator Henry Jackson, the committee's
chairman, id. at III-IV.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id.
52. Id. at IX-X.
53. See id. at 11-13.
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responsible for suggesting alternative courses of action to the President and
Congress for their consideration.5 4
The Senate study, therefore, discerned the danger of muddling through
the decisionmaking process without a policy which openly acknowledged
the existence and importance of environmental quality. In addition, the
study recognized that this policy would have to be capable of being applied
to actual problems. The study's proposal for implementing this new policy,
however, was limited to a method by which overarching environmental
issues could be presented to the President and Congress. There was no
consideration of how to reorient in an effective manner the thinking and
biases of the many federal agencies that had traditionally taken a narrow
approach to achieving their immediate policy objectives.
The publication of these two documents was closely followed by a joint
House-Senate colloquium to consider a national policy for the environment 55
and the issuance of a white paper containing possible elements of that
policy.m By this time, a consensus seemed to be emerging in Congress that
the physical alteration of the environment had to be planned rather than
left to happenstance.17 A process to assure that environmental planning
would occur in day-to-day federal decisionmaking, however, remained to
be invented. Nevertheless, the issue had moved to the top of the congres-
sional agenda.
B. 1969: NEPA Emerges
Early in 1969 Senator Henry Jackson introduced Senate Bill 1075.58 In
his introductory remarks, Senator Jackson announced that his bill would
establish a national strategy for managing the human environment.5 9 It was,
however, far from clear how the provisions of his bill would do so. S.
1075, strangely enough, did not set forth any grand national environmental
policy. Rather, the bill merely stated that its purpose was to promote
54. See id. at 11, 19.
55. Joint House-Senate Colloquium to Discuss a Nat'l Policy for the Env't: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs and the House Comm. on Science and
Astronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The colloquium, co-chaired by Senator Jackson
and Representative Miller, was an informal study session which brought together legislators,
government officials, academics, and other concerned citizens. Dreyfus & Ingram, supra note
42, at 249.
56. SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFsAIRs AND THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE
AND ASTRONAUTICS, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONGRESSIONAL WHITE PAPER ON A NAT'L POLICY
FOR THE ENV'T (Comm. Print 1968).
57. See, e.g., id. at 11.
58. S. 1075, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), reprinted in National Environmental Policy:
Hearing on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1969) [hereinafter Senate NEPA Hearings].
59. 115 CONG. Rzc. 3,698 (1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson).
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measures to prevent or reduce adverse environmental harm.60 To that end,
the bill would have authorized the Secretary of the Interior to perform
environmental research 6 and would have established a Council on Environ-
mental Quality in the Executive Office of the President to study environ-
mental trends and advise the President on the formulation of environmental
policy.6 Senator Jackson's thinking, therefore, appears not to have pro-
gressed very far from the proposal that had been floated during the previous
summer. 63
Representative John Dingell also introduced a bill near the beginning of
the Ninety-First Congress." Unlike Senator Jackson's bill, Representative
Dingell's bill set forth a ringing declaration of national environmental
policy6 which would later be codified, in slightly altered form, as section
101(a) of NEPA. 6 Nevertheless, his bill fell short of creating a means
through which this ambitious objective could be achieved, providing only
for the creation of CEQ.67 Over the remaining months of 1969, both houses
of Congress, but especially the Senate, would struggle with developing some
way to influence ordinary federal decisionmaking.
The Senate hearings played a pivotal role in the search for an action-
forcing mechanism. 68 During his appearance, Professor Lynton Caldwel 69
criticized the muddled nature of the legislation which was pending before
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. First, he asserted
that the "absence of an adequate policy statement" was a serious omission.70
60. S. 1075, at 1-2, reprinted in Senate NEPA Hearings, supra note 58, at 1.
61. Id. § 101, reprinted in Senate NEPA Hearings, supra note 58, at 1-2.
62. Id. §§ 201-202, reprinted in Senate NEPA Hearings, supra note 58, at 2-3; see Dreyfus
& Ingram, supra note 42, at 250 (describing the limited nature of Sen. Jackson's bill).
63. In fact, Senator Jackson seemed to have retreated from at least one position he took
during the preceeding summer. At that time, he stated that the government will have to "pay
closer attention to a far greater range of alternatives and potential consequences when [making
decisions that affect the environment]." A NAT'L POLICY FOR Tim ENVIRONMENT, supra note
49, at III-IV (introductory statement by Sen. Jackson). That introductory remark seems to
have presaged, albeit in rather cursory fashion, two of the most significant elements of NEPA's
impact statement requirement. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
64. H.R. 6750, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in Environmental Quality: Hearings
on H.R. 6750, H.R. 11886, H.R. 11942, H.R. 12077, H.R. 12180, H.R. 12207, H.R. 12209,
H.R. 12228, H.R. 12264, H.R. 12409 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
3-4 (1969) [hereinafter House NEPA Hearings].
65. H.R. 6750 § 5A(a), reprinted in House NEPA Hearings, id. at 3.
66. NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982).
67. H.R. 6750 § 5A(c), reprinted in House NEPA Hearings, supra note 64, at 3.
68. See generally Senate NEPA Hearings, supra note 58.
69. Professor Caldwell was a professor of government at Indiana University. Id. at 112.
He authored the study entitled A NAT'L POuCY FOR THE ENV'r, which the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs had published in 1968. See supra note 49.
70. Senate NEPA Hearings, supra note 58, at 134 (statement of Prof. Caldwell); see also




Second, he argued that even an adequate policy statement was not enough
without some process for its implementation. Professor Caldwell, therefore,
called for the creation of an "action-forcing" measure that would compel
federal agencies "to take the kind of action which will protect [the quality
of the nation's environment]."' 7 As to the details, he was somewhat vague,
but he did suggest that Congress might consider requiring federal agencies
to evaluate the environmental effects of their proposed activities. 72
Senator Jackson was quite taken by Professor Caldwell's testimony, the
criticism of S. 1075 notwithstanding. 73 After revealing that he, too, had
been concerned with the adequacy of the "policy declaration" in his bill, 74
Senator Jackson stated:
I agree with you that realistically what is needed in restructuring the
governmental side of this problem is to legislatively create those situations
that will bring about an action-forcing procedure the departments must
comply with. Otherwise, these lofty declarations are nothing more than
that. It is merely a finding and statement but there is no requirement
as to implementation75
He then proffered a possible remedy: Perhaps all federal agencies "should
be required to make an environmental finding" in connection with particular
actions . 76
During the hearings, however, much more attention was focused upon
the proposed creation of CEQ. A number of federal agencies expressed
their opposition to its establishment because President Nixon was about to
assemble an interdepartmental environmental council composed primarily
of cabinet officers. 77 Many senators and others, therefore, rushed to defend
the concept of a more independent council.78 In the process, some light was
shed upon the role envisioned for such a council. Professor Caldwell, for
example, testified that "an independent forum" was necessary to watch
over the nation's environment. 79 Only a high-level, independent institution
71. Id. at 116.
72. See id.
73. Senator Jackson may have been nonplussed by this criticism since he had freely admitted
that S. 1075 was "a working paper." Id. at 83.
74. Id. at 116. Senator Jackson may well have been referring to the brief statement of
purpose that appeared in the original draft of S. 1075. See text accompanying note 60.
75. Senate NEPA Hearings, supra note 58, at 116.
76. Id. at 117.
77. See, e.g., id. at 3-4 (comments of the Department of the Interior); id. at 4-6 (comments
of the Department of Agriculture); id. 6-7 (comments of the Bureau of the Budget). Dr. Lee
DuBridge, the President's Science Advisor, stated that this council would bring together a few
cabinet members, under the chairmanship of the President, to discuss and deal with various
environmental concerns. Id. at 71-72.
78. See, e.g., id. at 62-63 (statement of Sen. Nelson); id. at 66-67 (statement of Rep.
Reuss); id. at 84-86 (remarks of Sen. Jackson); id. at 149-51 (remarks of Michael McCloskey,
Sierra Club).
79. Id. at 114.
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could "be counted upon . . . to raise the difficult and inconvenient ques-
tions."0 Senator Jackson agreed and stressed the importance of locating
such a council in the Executive Office of the President in order to provide
an effective counterpoint to the more parochial views of the established
agencies. 8
At the conclusion of the hearings, the committee went into executive
session to draft its version of the bill.82 When the bill was reported on July
9, 1969, it was obvious that the committee had taken Professor Caldwell's
critique to heart. The bill sent to the full Senate announced a national
policy for the environment in much the same form as now appears in
section 101 of NEPA.83 In addition, the bill contained an action-forcing
mechanism that would require an agency "finding" with regard to the
environmental impact of major federal actions. 4
In reporting on S. 1075, the committee noted that its membership was
of the unanimous opinion that existing public policies and governmental
institutions were unable to cope with the environmental problems confront-
ing the nation.A5 The bill, therefore, set forth a comprehensive national
policy to reorder national priorities8 6 as well as the action-forcing procedure
of section 102 to help "insure that the policies enunciated in section 101
are implemented. " 87 The report also dealt with the institutional arrangements
created by the bill to oversee the manner in which the federal bureaucracy
responds to the challenge of environmental management.
As in the original version of S. 1075, the committee's bill would create
an environmental quality council in the Executive Office of the President
to perform a variety of functions." One such task was to "periodically
review and appraise" federal activities which affect the quality of the
nation's environment.89 According to the committee's report, however, this
80. Id. at 119. He added that this would be such a difficult task that service on the council
"would probably preclude a future political career for a person who would [serve on it]." Id.
at 120.
81. See id. at 120.
82. SENATE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note 9, at 11.
83. Compare S. 1075, as amended, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 [hereinafter Amended S.
1075], reprinted in SENATE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note 9, at 1-2 with NEPA § 101, 42
U.S.C. § 4331 (1982).
84. Amended S. 1075, supra note 83, § 102(c), reprinted in SENATE REPORT ON NEPA,
supra note 9, at 2.
85. See SENATE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note 9, at 4.
86. See id. at 5.
87. Id. at 19. Thus, according to the committee, § 102 was "designed to assure that all
Federal agencies plan and work toward meeting the challenge of a better environment." Id.
at 9.
88. See Amended S. 1075, supra note 83, §§ 301-305, reprinted in SENATE REPORT ON
NEPA, supra note 9, at 3-4 (now referring to this council as "a Board of Environmental
Quality Advisors").
89. Id. at § 302(b), reprinted in SENATE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note 9, at 4.
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role was limited to the examination of the "general direction" of federal
programs in order to "provide the President with a new insight into the
long-range needs and priorities of the country." 9 The responsibility for
"day-to-day decisionmaking" and the resolution of interagency disputes, in
the committee's view, would more properly reside with the President or an
existing agency like the Bureau of the Budget.9' On July 10, 1969, the
Senate passed the committee's bill by unanimous consent, without debate,
and referred the bill to the House of Representatives. 92
The House, in the meantime, held hearings on Representative Dingell's
bill.93 Those hearings produced little of real significance except to stress the
value of a high-level, independent CEQ within the Executive Office of the
White House. 94 Some witnesses apparently thought that CEQ could play an
important role in implementing the bill's ambitious policy statement. 95 From
Representative Dingell's remarks, however, it is difficult to discern whether
he envisioned CEQ's function as an aggressive overseer of administrative
action or as a long-range planning and assessment tool. 96 While he did
express concern at one point about how to ensure that the bill's policy
would influence agency decisionmaking, he seemed content to rely upon an
annual CEQ report, congressional oversight, and vigorous public partici-
pation to police agency action.Y
When House Bill 12549 emerged from committee, it was nearly identical
to Representative Dingell's original bill. 98 It thus merely set forth a policy
declaration" and provided for the creation of CEQ.' ° The committee's
report did articulate a somewhat coherent role for CEQ. The principal
purpose of CEQ was to "provide a consistent and expert source of review
90. SENATE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note 9, at 24-25.
91. Id. at 25. In addition, the committee suggested that the President's new cabinet-level
environmental council could perform this sort of immediate supervision. Id.
All of the functions performed by the Bureau of the Budget were transferred to the newly-
established Office of Management and Budget in 1970. Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1970, 3 C.F.R.
1070 (1966-1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1129-30 (1982).
92. 115 CoNo. REc. 19,008-13 (1969).
93. House NEPA Hearings, supra note 64.
94. See, e.g., id. at 120 (remarks of Lloyd Tupling, Sierra Club); id. at 363 (remarks of
Rep. Pelly).
95. See, e.g., id. at 55 (remarks of William Towell, American Forestry Association); id.
at 424 (remarks of Peter Hunt, Peter Hunt Associates).
96. Compare id. at 137 (calling CEQ "an institution which can speak fearlessly" on
environmental questions) with id. at 2 (describing CEQ as an "independent body" to study
and analyze environmental "trends").
97. See id. at 424 (colloquy with Peter Hunt, Peter Hunt Associates).
98. Compare H.R. 6750, reprinted in House NEPA Hearings, supra note 64, at 3-4, with
H.R. 12549, as reported, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in HousE REPORT ON NEPA,
supra note 15, at 23-24.
99. H.R. 12549, supra note 98, § 5A(a), reprinted in HousE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note
15, at 23.
100. Id. § 5A(c), reprinted in HousE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note 15, at 23.
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of national policies, environmental problems and trends, both long term
and short term."'01 In more immediate terms, however, CEQ was expected
to maintain "a constant review of Federal programs and activities . . .
[and keep] the President informed on the degree to which those programs
and activities may be consistent with [the policy established by the bill]."' 0 2
The report acknowledged, moreover, that CEQ might become an asset as
an instrument for resolving internal policy disputes within the executive
branch. 103
On September 23, 1969, the House passed the committee's bill by the
overwhelming margin of 372 to 15,104 but not before a number of represen-
tatives emphasized CEQ's role as a monitor of agency compliance with the
bill. Representative Daddario summarized their views perhaps most suc-
cinctly when he referred to CEQ as a "watchdog for the public and the
Congress on the activities of the Federal departments."' 1°
Since the Senate had already passed another version of the bill, the House
immediately requested a conference.'0 A curious thing then occurred before
the Senate agreed to the conference: It amended the bill.
A jurisdictional clash had been stirring for some time between Senator
Jackson and Senator Muskie, chairman of the Air and Water Pollution
101. HousE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note 15, at 8.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Id. at 8.
104. 115 CONG. REc. 26,590 (1969). Prior to its passage, however, Representative Aspinall
was successful in obtaining, or perhaps coercing, an amendment which stated that "[n]othing
in this Act shall increase, decrease, or change any responsibility or authority of any Federal
official or agency . . . ." Id. at 26,589-90 (adding § 9 to H.R. 12549). Had this language
not been dropped subsequently by the conference committee, the amendment would have
"negated" the action-forcing provisions found in the Senate version of NEPA. NEPA iN THE
COURTS, supra note 22, at 7; see also R. ANDREws, supra note 42, at 11 (stating that this
provision would have made NEPA "an unenforceable statement of general policy").
While Representative Dingell may not have favored this amendment, it has been suggested
that he had little choice but to accept it. See id. at 11 n.19. Representative Aspinall not only
disliked NEPA, see R. Lmors, supra note 24, at 11, but, as a committee chairman and member
of the Rules Committee, he might have been able to keep the bill from ever coming to a vote.
Thus, acceptance of this amendment may well have been the price for letting the bill reach
the House floor. See id.
105. 115 CoNG. REc. at 26,583 (1969); see also id. at 26,576 (remarks of Rep. Rogers
(Florida)) (stating that continuing CEQ review of federal activities "is necessary because the
various agencies and departments of the Federal government do not always act harmoniously"
in their use of the environment); id. at 26,576-77 (remarks of Rep. Karth) (describing the
creation of CEQ as an institutional arrangement "which will put policy into practice"); id. at
26,579 (remarks of Rep. Yates) (expressing his hope that CEQ "will act as an ardent advocate
of the need to protect our besieged natural resources and not merely as a study group"); id.
at 26,584 (remarks of Rep. Monagan) (calling for a CEQ that would "oversee and coordinate
the multiple and often conflicting programs pursued by the different levels of government").
Representatives Rogers and Karth were majority members of the subcommittee which developed
the House bill.
106. Id. at 26,591. Representatives Dingell, Garmatz, Aspinall, Pelly, and Saylor were named
as House conferees. Id.
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Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public Works.17 While Senator
Jackson's committee developed S. 1075, Senator Muskie was pushing the
Water Quality Improvement Act toward final Senate action.'0 In time
Senator Muskie became troubled about an apparent conflict between the
two bills.
Senator Muskie's bill would require a state water quality certification as
a condition precedent to the issuance of any federal license or permit for
an activity that might result in the discharge of water pollutants."' 9 He
believed that this was necessary to check the natural proclivity of develop-
ment-oriented agencies to ignore adverse effects upon water quality."0 S.
1075, on the other hand, would allow these same developmental agencies
to make "finding[s]" concerning the environmental impact of their own
activities. Senator Muskie argued that such a "concept of self-policing by
Federal agencies which pollute or license pollution [was] contrary" not only
to his proposed legislation but also to the philosophy of existing pollution
control law."' It would be all too easy for an agency to elevate its primary
mission over environmental considerations." 2
In order to resolve this inconsistency, Senators Muskie and Jackson
negotiated a belated amendment to the pending NEPA legislation. Their
compromise substituted the requirement of a "detailed statement" for the
107. See NEPA N nm CouRTs, supra note 22, at 7; R. ANDREws, supra note 42, at 12.
While Senator Muskie's subcommittee clearly enjoyed jurisdiction over pollution control
matters, it was unclear where to draw the line between his subcommittee and Senator Jackson's
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on a measure dealing broadly with environmental
quality. See 115 CoNG. Ric. 29,054-55 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson). Further, this "turf
fight" was likely motivated, at least in part, by the desire of both Senators to gain reputations
as "good" environmentalists, especially since the presidential primary season was in the offing.
See generally R. ANDamws, supra note 42, at 12 (reporting that the two Senators were engaged
in a struggle for "environmental prestige").
108. See R. ANDREWs, supra note 42, at 12.
109. S. 7, as reported, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1969) (amending redesignated § 16(c) of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act), reprinted in S. RaP. 346, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 113-
15 (1969). A quite similar provision was eventually enacted as § 103 of the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (amending redesignated §
21 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act) (superceded 1972). Today, the Clean Water
Act contains a nearly identical requirement. See Clean Water Act § 401(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)
(1982).
110. 115 CONG. Rac. 29,053 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
111. Id. at 29,052-53.
112. Id. at 29,053. In short, Senator Muskie harbored serious doubts about the reliability
of environmental findings made by mission-oriented public works agencies. See R. LmoiF,
supra note 24, at 18-19; Dreyfus & Ingram, supra note 42, at 253.
In addition to his hostility to the concept of "self-policing," Senator Muskie appeared
worried about the impact of an agency's environmental "finding" upon the requirement of
state water quality certification in his bill. See id. at 29,052-53. For example, if an agency
found that a particular action involved acceptable environmental harm, would it still have to
obtain a clean bill of health from the affected state?
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"finding" in section 102(c).113 Thus, according to Senator Muskie, a "pol-
luter" would not have the final word in the assessment of environmental
effects." 4 In addition, the Senators inserted a new directive. Prior to making
such a "detailed statement," the agency contemplating action would have
to consult with and obtain the views of those agencies which possess relevant
environmental authority or expertise. 15 In Senator Muskie's view, these
changes would give those agencies most concerned with environmental
quality an opportunity to supervise the NEPA process." 6 During the ensuing
debate, no senator questioned Senator Muskie's characterization of the new
language. 1 7
Apparently pleased with these changes and relieved that the jurisdictional
dispute had been resolved, the Senate accepted the terms of the Muskie-
Jackson compromise." 8 The bill, cast in its new form, then went to con-
ference."19
After two months of deliberation, the conference committee agreed upon
a substitute bill and issued its report on December 17, 1969.'m The com-
promise struck by the conference generally blended the provisions of the
House and Senate bills. Consequently, the declaration of environmental
policy and the provisions creating CEQ contained significant elements from
both earlier bills.' 2' The conference, however, accepted the action-forcing
procedures found in section 102 of the Senate bill, for which there was no
comparable provision in the House version.'2 In doing so, the conferees
113. S. 1075, as modified by the Muskie-Jackson compromise, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §
102(c), 115 CONG. REc. 29,051 (1969).
114. 115 CONG. REc. 29,053 (1969). Moreover, to resolve any possible remaining inconsis-
tency between NEPA and various pollution requirements, see supra note 112, the Senators
agreed to add a new § 103 which explicitly stated that § 102 does not in any way affect the
statutory obligations that a federal agency may have to abide by environmental standards or
to obtain a certification from a state agency. S. 1075, as modified by the Muskie-Jackson
compromise, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 103, 115 CONG. REc. 29,051-52 (1969); see also 115 CONG.
REc. 29,058 (1969) (memorandum submitted by Sen. Jackson discussing the addition of §
103).
115. S. 1075, as modified by the Muskie-Jackson compromise, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. §
102(c), 115 CONG. REc. 29,051 (1969).
116. 115 CONG. REc. 29,053 (1969).
117. See 115 CONG. Ric. 29,053-89 (1969). Senator Church perhaps reflected the general
sentiment in the Senate when he praised S. 1075 as the first legislative effort "to impress and
implant on the Federal agencies an awareness and concern for the total environmental impact
of their actions and proposed programs." Id. at 29,059.
118. Id. at 29,087-89.
119. Senators Jackson, Church, Nelson, Allott, and Jordan (Idaho) were appointed as the
Senate conferees. Id. at 29,089. They were specifically instructed to insist on the modifications
made by the Jackson-Muskie compromise. Id. at 29,087-89.
120. CONFERENCE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note 7.
121. See id. at 7-8, 11-12 (statement of the managers on the part of the House); see generally
R. ANDREws, supra note 42, at 13-14 (discussing the significant modifications made to the
bills during conference).
122. CONFERENCE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note 7, at 8-10 (statement of the managers on
the part of the House).
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added some language to section 102 that underscored the vigor with which
federal agencies were to implement those action-forcing mechanisms.
The conference inserted the requirement that all federal agencies must
comply "to the fullest extent possible" with the provisions of section 102.2
According to the conference report, this phrase compels total compliance
from the agencies unless existing law expressly prohibits full compliance or
renders compliance impossible. 24 Senator Jackson, therefore, was able to
say with considerable confidence that section 102 would help "insure that
the policies and goals defined in [NEPAl are infused into the ongoing
programs and actions of the Federal Government . . . ."
His sanguine assessment obviously flowed from his hope that section 102,
in its final form, would lead action-oriented federal agencies to internalize
environmental quality considerations in their decisionmaking processes. 126
Senator Jackson, however, was also keenly aware of the role that certain
external forces would play in modifying agency behavior. He noted that
the requirement for consultation with environmental agencies was, in and
of itself, an important "action-forcing" procedure. 27 Moreover, he fully
anticipated high-level executive branch oversight. 2s
The final version of the bill also led Senator Muskie to claim that it
would exert strong pressure on federal agencies "to respond to the needs
of environmental quality.' ' 29 His positive evaluation appeared heavily influ-
enced by the conference committee's adoption of those aspects of the
Muskie-Jackson compromise which would seem to ensure continuing ad-
123. Id. at 8.
124. Id. at 9.
125. 115 CoNG. Rac. 40,416 (1969). See also id. at 40,419 (section-by-section analysis offered
by Sen. Jackson) (stating that the "action-forcing procedures" of § 102 are intended "to
insure that the policies enunciated in section 101 are implemented"). Thus, Senator Jackson
concluded, "[I]f there are to be departures from this standard of [environmental] excellence
[created by NEPA] they should be exceptions to the rule and the policy." Id. at 40,416.
126. See R. LmonF, supra note 24, at 18-19.
127. 115 CONG. REc. 40,416 (1969).
128. See id. at 40,421 (section-by-section analysis offered by Sen. Jackson). In reviewing
high-level executive branch oversight, Senator Jackson drew heavily upon the wording of the
Senate committee report. Compare id. with SENATE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note 9, at 24-
25. He thus stated that the Council on Environmental Quality would "periodically examine
the general direction" of federal programs with regard to their environmental effects and
would provide the President with "general" recommendations for any necessary reforms in
those programs. 115 CONG. Rac. 40,421 (1969) (section-by-section analysis offered by Sen.
Jackson). Senator Jackson, furthermore, was careful to avoid any suggestion that CEQ would
displace the existing decisionmaking apparatus for resolving interagency disputes. Consequently,
he indicated that the burden of resolving such conflicts would remain the province of the
President, a cabinet-level council, or the Bureau of the Budget. See id.; see also id. at 40,925
(reply of Rep. Dingell to written inquiries from Rep. Fallon) (similarly stating that CEQ would
examine the "general" impact of federal activities upon the environment and make "general"
recommendations for change, but would not involve itself in the resolution of particular
conflicts between federal agencies).
129. 115 CONG. Rsc. 40,425 (1969).
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ministrative oversight of the NEPA process: the requirement that develop-
mental agencies issue detailed statements, rather than findings, only after
consultation and review from more environmentally-minded agencies. 130
Senator Muskie, thus observed, most likely with considerable satisfaction,
that those agencies whose activities might harm the environment would not
have the last word on the environmental impact of their actions.' 3'
With the Christmas recess looming near, neither the House nor the Senate
was particularly disposed to prolonging the debate over the merits of the
conference report.1 2 Consequently, both houses quickly took action and
approved the report. 33 On New Year's Day 1970, President Nixon signed
NEPA into law. 1 4
C. 1970: Creating an Institutional Watchdog
The glowing Congressional assessments of December 1969 soon began to
pale in light of actual experience. Many agencies simply failed to appreciate
the new procedural and substantive demands made by NEPA. The environ-
mental agencies, moreover, appeared either unable or unwilling to counter
the resistence offered by older and stronger components of the executive
branch. Out of sheer exasperation, therefore, Congress enacted section 309
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 197015 which significantly augmented
NEPA's previously inadequate provision for administrative oversight. 3 6
Although the legislative history of section 309 is sparse, it does reveal the
pressing need, as perceived by Congress, for an institutional arrangement
which would continuously and forcefully police federal action for compliance
with NEPA.
By the summer of 1970, a number of Senators had become skeptical
about the efficacy of the consultation and commenting mechanism estab-
lished by section 102 of NEPA. Their concern surfaced in the Subcommittee
130. See id.
131. See id.; see also R. AmNanws, supra note 42, at 13 (stating that these two changes
strengthened the action-forcing provisions of NEPA by creating "mechanisms for external
review and challenge").
132. See 115 CONG. Rc. 40,415-27 (1969) (Senate consideration of the conference report-
Dec. 20, 1969); id. at 40,923-28 (House consideration of the conference report-Dec. 22, 1969).
Both houses adjourned on December 23, 1969. Id. at 41,009 (House action); id. at 41,167
(Senate action).
133. See id. at 40,427 (Senate adoption of conference report); id. at 40,928 (House adoption
of conference report).
134. Remarks on Signing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1970 PUB. PAPERS
1 (January 1, 1970).
135. Clean Air Act § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (1982).
136. This refers, of course, to the obligation placed upon any agency which is developing
an EIS to consult with and obtain the views of the relevant environmental agencies prior to




on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works
during its consideration of proposed amendments to the Clean Air Act.
Although neither the original bills 3 7 nor the hearings 3 addressed the
problem of overseeing the implementation of NEPA, the bill which the
subcommittee, chaired by Senator Muskie, eventually submitted to the full
committee did. 39
The subcommittee's approach to the problem, however, was not compre-
hensive. The bill required the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) 40 to review the air pollution aspects of any environmental impact
statement prepared by the federal government.' 41 In the event that any such
"detailed statement" was found "unsatisfactory from the standpoint of
public health or welfare or environmental quality," the Secretary was
ordered to refer the matter to CEQ, which would make a recommendation
to the President. 42 The bill, therefore, was apparently limited to an evalu-
ation of the air pollution impacts associated with a particular federal
proposal. 43 Nevertheless, the subcommittee's bill did require that such a
review take place, regardless of whether the agency contemplating action
had requested it, and also provided an explicit avenue for elevating a dispute
over an EIS to the level of CEQ.
Within a month, the full committee reported its bill to the Senate.'" The
bill retained this new, but as yet narrow, approach to NEPA review and
137. See S. 3229, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (by Sen. Muskie); S. 3466, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970) (by Sen. Scott); S. 3546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (by Sen. Muskie).
138. See Air Pollution-1970, Pts. 1-5: Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, S. 3546 Before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter Senate Clean Air Act Hearings]. One environmentalist did point
out that the mission-oriented agencies were bound to resist the reorientation in policy required
by NEPA. Id. Pt. 4, at 1209 (statement by Frank M. Potter, Jr., Executive Director of the
Environmental Clearinghouse) ("It remains to be seen . . . to what extent the executive
agencies will be successful in their inevitable efforts to weaken the impact of [NEPA].").
139. Id. Pt. 5, at V-LXXXVIII.
140. At this time, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare administered the Clean
Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857-18571 (Supp. IV 1964). Within the sprawling halls of HEW,
the air pollution effort was located in the National Air Pollution Control Administration. See
C. DAVIEs & B. DAvIEs, Tm PoL mrcs oF PoLLuTION 104 (2d ed. 1975).
On December 2, 1970, this authority was transferred to the newly created United States
Environmental Protection Agency. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-1970),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C app. at 1132-37 (1982) [hereinafter Reorg. Plan No. 3].
141. Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, Pt. 5, supra note 138, at LXXXVI (adding § 308(a)
to the Clean Air Act).
142. Id. (adding § 308(b) to the Clean Air Act). CEQ's recommendation was to be made
public. Id.
143. The provision also required the Secretary to review any proposed agency regulation,
insofar as it pertained to air pollution, and to refer any such regulation deemed environmentally
unsatisfactory to CEQ. See id. (adding § 308 to the Clean Air Act).
144. S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1 LEoisiAIVE HBsToRY 1970, supra
note 20, at 531. This action came on September 17, 1970, id., and Senator Muskie was the
bill's primary sponsor, id.
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oversight. 145 In discussing the provision, the committee declared that
"[m]ission-oriented agencies often lack the expertise to give adequate eval-
uation to the environmental impact of their own activities."' 14 NEPA,
moreover, did not necessarily remedy this situation since it did not "assure
that Federal environmental agencies [would] effectively participate in the
decision-making process."' 147 Thus the committee believed it necessary to
craft an explicit statutory provision requiring an environmental agency to
review the environmental merits of various impact statements 48 and to refer
"unsatisfactory" statements to CEQ.149
The tone of the committee's report suggests that it would have liked to
have extended this form of review and oversight to include the entire
panoply of environmental matters. The committee, however, was constrained
by the limited jurisdiction of HEW. Consequently, the scope of this review
was confined to matters "directly or indirectly" related to air pollution.1 50
So styled, the forerunner to section 309 was passed by the Senate on
September 22, 1970 as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments. 5' Since the
House had already approved a different version of the bill, 52 the House
145. Id. § 310, reprinted in 1 LEGisLATIE HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 622-23.
146. S. REP. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1970), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIW HISTORY 1970,
supra note 20, at 444.
147. Id. at 43, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 443.
148. See id. at 43-44, reprinted in I LEGIsLATrVE HLTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 443-44
(stating that the Secretary must analyze impact statements "with respect to public health and
welfare and environmental quality").
149. Id. at 66, reprinted in I LEGILATrVE HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 446 (section-by-
section analysis).
A number of commentators, however, have expressed the opinion that the Senate bill focused
environmental review merely upon the procedural adequacy of impact statements. See Anderson,
supra note 24, at 268; Healy, The Environmental Protection Agency's Duty to Oversee NEPA 's
Implementation: Section 309 of the Clean Air Act, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,071,
50,080 n.62 (1973). While some language in the committee report lends support to this view,
see S. REP. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1970), reprinted in 1 LEGISL ATIV HISTORY 1970,
supra note 20, at 444 (stating that an "inadequate" EIS must be referred), the language of
the proposed legislation belies the argument.
The phrase "unsatisfactory from the standpoint of public health or welfare or environmental
quality," see supra text accompanying note 142, certainly implicates the substantive merits of
an EIS and the proposed action contained therein. Moreover, the same phrase was used to
trigger the referral of a proposed agency regulation for which an EIS was not even prepared.
See supra note 143. Since such a regulation cannot be viewed as "inadequate" using EIS
criteria, the Senate committee must have meant that EISs and proposed regulations alike had
to be reviewed for substantive acceptability.
150. S. REP. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 66, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATrV HISTORY 1970,
supra note 20, at 466 (section-by-section analysis).
151. 1 LEGISLATIV HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 392-93. The bill passed unanimously
by a vote of 73 to 0. Id.
152. H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATrW HISTORY 1970,
supra note 20, at 910. The House had passed this bill on June 10, 1970. 2 LEGISLATIV HISTORY
1970, supra note 20, at 888-90.
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and Senate bills were referred to conference. 153
The conference committee worked hard and long.1 54 One factor contrib-
uting to the difficulties faced by the conference was the presence of many
provisions in the Senate bill having no counterpart in the House bill.15 5 One
such provision was the Senate's version of section 309.156 In addition, it
soon became obvious that the conferees were formulating a much more
comprehensive system of administrative oversight.
When section 309 finally emerged from conference on December 17,
1970,157 it had been radically refashioned. With the advent of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency on December 2, 1970,15a the con-
ferees were no longer confined by the rather narrow jurisdiction which
HEW had possessed. As a result, the conference version of section 309,
which was ultimately enacted into law, 59 ordered EPA to comment in
writing on all federal actions relating to EPA's duties and responsibilities
including all actions which require the preparation of an impact statement.' 60
EPA's scope of authority goes far beyond the limited horizons of clean air.
In fact, EPA's authority-which includes air, water, solid waste, pesticides,
radiation, drinking water, and noise-is so expansive that it encompasses
virtually all environmental concerns. 16'
153. 116 CONG. REc. 33,600-01 (1970) (House action); id. at 34,042 (Senate action). The
following Senators were appointed as conferees on the part of the Senate: Muskie, Randolph,
Young (Ohio), Spong, Eagleton, Cooper, Boggs, Baker, and Dole. Id. at 34,042. The House
named the following Representatives to the conference: Staggers, Jarman, Rogers (Florida),
Springer, and Nelson. Id. at 33,601.
154. See 1 LEGISLATrvE HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 123 (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
155. See id.
156. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1970), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 208.
157. See id. at 1, reprinted in 1 LEOisLTrIVE HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 151.
158. Reorg. Plan No. 3, supra note 140, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1132-37 (1982). Pursuant
to this executive reorganization, the air pollution functions previously performed by
the National Air Pollution Control Administration within HEW were moved to EPA. Id. §
2(a)(3)(i), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1133 (1982).
159. Compare H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1970) (§ 309), reprinted
in 1 LEGIsLATrv HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 186 with Clean Air Act § 309, 42 U.S.C. §
7609 (1982).
160. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1970) (§ 309(a)), reprinted
in in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 186. EPA was thus required to comment
in writing on any major federal action for which an EIS should be prepared, even if the
responsible agency had refused or neglected to do so. See id.; W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 709 (1977). In addition, EPA had to review and comment on the
environmental impact of all legislation proposed by a federal agency, newly authorized federal
construction projects, and proposed regulations noticed by any federal agency-regardless of
whether any of these activities were subject to the EIS requirement found in NEPA. See id.;
NEPA IN Tm CoURTs, supra note 22, at 232.
161. See NEPA IN Tim COURTS, supra note 22, at 231; W. RODGERS, supra note 160, at
709; Comment, Section 309 of the Clean Air Act: EPA 's Duty to Comment on Environmental
Impacts, 1 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,146, 10,148 (1971).
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In addition to casting a broad net over the actions subject to EPA review,
section 309 clearly required EPA to evaluate the environmental merits of
federal action. In doing so, the conference had dropped the Senate's
language which would have limited section 309 review to an evaluation of
impact statements alone.162 Instead, the conference version of section 309
explicitly directed EPA to comment, inter alia, on "any major Federal
agency action" to which NEPA applies. 163 If any such "action" is found
"unsatisfactory from the standpoint of public health or welfare or environ-
mental quality," EPA must publish the finding and refer the matter to
CEQ. 164
While the conference report confirms the shift in focus from substantive
review of impact statements to review aimed at the merits of federal action, 165
it sheds little light on why the conferees transformed a rather sleepy provision
into such a remarkable tool.'" During the course of the conference, however,
the Senate Public Works Committee began hearings on the confirmation of
William Ruckelshaus as the first Administrator of EPA.167 The first day of
those hearings-with eight of the nine Senate conferees in attendence' 6s-
produced a record which, perhaps fortuitously, contains the clearest ex-
pression of what the conference hoped to gain from section 309.169
162. See supra text accompanying notes 141-43, 148-49.
163. H.R. CoNF. RP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1970) (§ 309(a)), reprinted in 1
LEoIsLATiv HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 186.
164. Id. at 36 (§ 309(b)), reprinted in I LEGISLATrVE HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 186.
By shifting the publication requirement from CEQ to EPA, see supra note 142 and accom-
panying text, the conferees may have recognized that CEQ-as an advisor to the President-
"had less freedom to make frank comments than a large line agency." Liroff, The Council
on Environmental Quality, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,051, 50,058 n.59 (1973); see
also Healy, supra note 149, at 50,074 (stating that Congress wanted to give CEQ more
flexibility in handling environmental referrals).
165. The conference report stated that although the Senate bill was limited to the examination
of "environmental impact statements," the conference agreement instructed EPA to review
"Federal actions which affect the environment." H.R. CoNr. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 58 (1970), reprinted in I LEGISLATrVE HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 208.
166. See id. at 58-59, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIW HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 208-09.
167. Ruckelshaus Confirmation Hearings, supra note 20. The Ruckelshaus hearings created
quite a stir on Capitol Hill. The hearing room was packed with spectators and television
cameras, and members of the Senate committee filled every available panel seat. All were
anxious to gain some idea of how Ruckelshaus would wield the enormous power that EPA
had been given. See J. QuARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VmW OF TH ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 26-27 (1976).
168. Ruckelshaus Confirmation Hearings, supra note 20, at 1. The hearings began on the
morning of December 1, 1970. At this initial session, the only absentee among the Senate
conferees was Senator Eagleton. Id. The conference committee resumed its deliberations that
afternoon after a recess in the confirmation hearings. See id. at 33, 54 (remarks of Sen.
Randolph).
169. During the Senate debate on the conference report, Senator Muskie expressly referred
to the discussion of the policy concerns underlying § 309 which took place during the
confirmation hearings. I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1970, supra note 20, at 136. That remark,
together with the terse explanation of § 309 found in the conference report, led Professor
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From the start, it was obvious that Senator Muskie was alarmed about
the lackadaisical way in which agencies had approached their consultation
obligations under section 102 of NEPA. His alarm stemmed, at least in
part, from the comments made on the draft EIS that the Department of
Transportation had prepared for the proposed supersonic transport (SST).
Since the Senate was about to debate the appropriations bill for the SST,
Senator Muskie had requested a copy of the comments which the federal
environmental agencies had submitted on the proposal. The request, how-
ever, was denied; the comments had been oral and thus were unavailable.
170
Distressed by this flippant conduct, Senator Muskie angrily charged that
the NEPA consultation process "[had] been submerged and . . . given
second place."' 7'
This sorry state of affairs certainly did not comport with the intent of
the consultation process as an effective external policing mechanism.
72
Senator Muskie, therefore, soon turned his attention to section 309 which
he viewed as a remedy for what seemingly had been less than vigorous
external review.
Section 309, according to Senator Muskie, made EPA "a self-starter,
whenever you, unilaterally, see an environmental risk. You are given the
responsibility to raise the red flag."' 73 EPA's role, therefore, was to be an
environmental "gadfly" in order "to restrain or . . .to prevent [even] an
ongoing [federal] activity if, in [the agency's judgment], there is an unfor-
Frederick Anderson to treat the relevant portions of the Ruckelshaus hearings as part of the
section's legislative history. Anderson, supra note 24, at 269 n.106. For other materials relying
upon the confirmation hearings as a significant source of legislative history, see Hiatt Grain
& Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp. 457, 500 (D. Kan. 1978), aff'd 602 F.2d 929 (10th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980); Sierra Club v. Morton, 379 F. Supp. 1254,
1262 (D. Colo. 1974); Healy, supra note 149, at 50,072 n.11; Comment, supra note 161, at
10,147-48.
170. See Ruckelshaus Confirmation Hearings, supra note 20, at 16-17; see also Comment,
supra note 161, at 10,147 (elaborating on this aspect of the SST controversy).
171. Ruckelshaus Confirmation Hearings, supra note 20, at 16.
172. See id. at 16, 43 (remarks of Sen. Muskie). The Senate Public Works Committee,
furthermore, soon issued a report which seemed to echo Senator Muskie's discontent. S. REP.
No. 1422, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Not only did all of the Senate conferees serve on this
committee, see id. at II, but the report was issued while the conference was still in the midst
of deliberations, see id. at I.
The report complained that the environmental agencies, while commenting on EISs produced
by the Corps of Engineers, had been inclined to examine "the views of the impact agency,
rather than the impact of the project on the environment. [This practice] may tend toward
developing a self-serving justification for environmental impact rather than a-review of that
impact." Id. at 6. The committee, therefore, pinpointed a serious shortcoming in the NEPA
consultation process-the reluctance of federal environmental agencies to review the substantive
merits of potentially harmful actions.
173. Ruckelshaus Confirmation Hearings, supra note 20, at 45. The comments of Senator
Muskie are especially significant since he was "one of the prime architects" of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970. Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
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tunate environmental impact."'' 74 In other words, section 309 was more than
just a device to assure that mission-oriented agencies would have the benefit
of EPA's environmental expertise. It was designed to create an advocate
within the executive branch that would blow the whistle on harmful envi-
ronmental actions and press the case against such actions all the way to the
Executive Office of the President in the form of CEQ. 75
None of the other Senate conferees who were present objected to Senator
Muskie's characterization of section 309.176 Furthermore, nothing new was
added to the discussion of section 309 during the floor debates on the Clean
Air Act Amendments. 77 During the Senate debate, Senator Muskie was
content to emphasize that EPA review would focus on "major federal
actions" that affect the environment, as well as impact statements, and that
EPA's comments would be made public when the agency's review was
completed. 78 So construed, the Senate passed the bill. 79 In the House, the
subject of section 309 was never broached."t 0 That chamber approved the
bill without delay,' and section 309 soon became law.8 2
174. Ruckelshaus Confirmation Hearings, supra note 20, at 45-46 (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
Senator Muskie declared, moreover, that EPA's responsibility vis-a-vis ongoing activities would
not be diminished by the fact that "the first decision was taken 50 years ago." Id. at 46.
175. In response to a general question posed by Senator Gurney concerning the role of
EPA, Mr. Ruckelshaus replied:
If a decision is about to be made by another agency of Government that would
have a detrimental effect on the environment, then I think we have to stir up a
good deal of dispute over whether this decision should be made.
I think we have to be willing to make this advocacy right to the final
decisionmaker in the administrative branch, in the White House.
I believe if we are going to be effective as an advocate for protection of the
environment, we have to be willing to exercise that advocacy role within the
administration as well as without.
Id. at 43. Senator Muskie picked up on that theme a few minutes later as he was describing
§ 309. "We want you to be the advocate that you described in response to Senator Gurney's
question." Id. at 45.
176. See id. at 44-81.
177. The respective debates were dominated by various air pollution issues, not least of
which were those concerning automobile emission standards. See 1 LEGIsLAnIW HISTORY 1970,
supra note 20, at 111-21 (House consideration); id. at 123-50 (Senate consideration); see also
Healy, supra note 149, at 50,072 n.11 (stating that the importance of § 309 was consistently
overshadowed by the controversy surrounding the automobile standards).
178. See I LEGISIATIWE HIsToRY 1970, supra note 20, at 131. At this time, Senator Muskie
was serving as the floor manager of the conference report. See id. at 123-50.
179. Id. at 150.
180. See id. at 111-21.
181. Id. at 121.
182. The President signed the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 into law on December
31, 1970. See Remarks on Signing the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 1970 PUB. PA'nEs
1166 (December 31, 1970).
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II. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH OVERSIGHT
A. The Initial Experience: 1970-1978
NEPA itself created no comprehensive structure through which the ex-
ecutive branch could effectively monitor and police agency compliance with
NEPA. Although CEQ was assigned the duty to review the environmental
impact of federal activities, 83 this responsiblity was apparently restricted,
according to NEPA's legislative history, to a form of passive observation.
Both Senator Jackson and Representative Dingell, in fact, indicated that
CEQ was to confine itself to the periodic examination of federal activities
in order to give the President an accurate view of current environmental
problems.1 4 Consequently, while environmental agencies were commenting
on individual impact statements and CEQ was assessing the general trend
of federal programs, no particular agency was delegated the overall task of
supervising agency performance under NEPA. CEQ's role, however, was
destined to grow.
In March 1970, the President issued Executive Order 11,514,15 which
established a more active role for CEQ in overseeing NEPA's implemen-
tation.'16 The order instructed CEQ to "coordinate" federal programs
related to environmental quality, rather than just to passively observe
them.'87 To this end, CEQ was specifically directed by the President to issue
guidelines for federal agencies to use in the preparation of environmental
impact statements.188
CEQ soon exercised this new authority by publishing interim guidelines
in April 1970.189 Consistent with the executive order, the guidelines primarily
addressed the development of the impact statement process. 19° In doing so,
the guidelines added a significant new wrinkle. They required federal agen-
cies to issue draft as well as final impact statements to provide CEQ and
commenting agencies with an opportunity to study the environmental issues
183. NEPA § 204(3), 42 U.S.C. § 4344(3) (1982).
184. See supra note 128 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying notes 90-
91.
185. 3 C.F.R. 902 (1966-1970), reprinted at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app., at 10658 (1970) [hereinafter
Exec. Order 11,514].
186. See R. ANRuaws, supra note 42, at 28.
187. Exec. Order 11,514, supra note 185, § 3(f).
188. See id. § 3(h).
189. CEQ, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment: Interim
Guidelines, 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970) [hereinafter CEQ 1970 Interim Guidelines].
190. See id.; see also R. ANmDaws, supra note 42, at 29 (observing that the interim guidelines
"were almost wholly procedural rather than substantive").
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posed by a particular project prior to a final decision. 191 In addition, the
guidelines emphasized the early identification of alternative actions in order
to prevent the premature foreclosure of less detrimental options. 192 CEQ
was thus laying the groundwork for more effective administrative policing
of the NEPA process by giving itself and commenting agencies both the
time and information necessary for a thorough critique of an EIS.
The guidelines, however, failed to deal with two crucial aspects of an
effective oversight process. Where and how could a commenting agency
refer an inadequate EIS or an unsatisfactory project for high-level review
and possible resolution?
Congress, fortunately, resolved both problems when it enacted section
309 of the Clean Air Act. Section 309 made EPA and CEQ "full partner[s]"
in overseeing the implementation of NEPA.193 Although their roles are
complementary, each is charged with a separate, discrete task within the
oversight process. EPA is the day-to-day watchdog of NEPA compliance,
responsible for reviewing and commenting upon all federal actions which
have significant environmental impact. 94 This responsibility enables EPA to
single out those actions which have particularly harmful effects and refer
them to CEQ.' 95 CEQ, in turn, is assigned the task of reviewing problem
cases which EPA brings to its attention. 196
Section 309, therefore, took full advantage of the respective strengths of
these two agencies. EPA, with its larger staff capabilities and regional
structure, was and remains well-suited to its role as a central checkpoint
for all agency actions presenting a risk of adverse environmental impact. 97
As a much smaller agency, CEQ could never hope to perform that func-
tion. 198 On the other hand, CEQ, drawing on both its position as a
presidential advisor' 99 and its location in the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent,m possesses the institutional authority to bring considerable pressure
to bear on those agencies whose projects have been classified by EPA as
environmentally unsatisfactory. 20'
191. CEQ 1970 Interim Guidelines, supra note 189, at 7392, § 10. The guidelines also
provided that agencies were to elicit the comments of the appropriate state and local agencies.
Id. § 9.
192. Id. § 7(a)(iii).
193. Healy, supra note 149, at 50,071.
194. Clean Air Act § 309(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (1982).
195. See id. § 309(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7609(b) (1982). Such a referral is also made available to
the public. See id.
196. See id.
197. See W. RoDoExs, supra note 160, at 710.
198. See Healy, supra note 149, at 50,072.
199. See NEPA § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1982); see also Anderson, supra note 24, at 248
(describing CEQ's role as an "advisor to the president").
200. NEPA § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1982).
201. Ultimately, however, the amount of influence possessed by CEQ depends on the degree
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Through the enactment of this remarkably perceptive piece of legislation,
Congress created "a formidable administrative team"2 which, theoretically
at least, should be capable of both fully monitoring relevant federal projects
and ensuring a high degree of agency compliance with the requirements of
NEPA. Neither EPA nor CEQ, however, was especially eager to realize the
full potential of this powerful oversight arrangement.
Following the enactment of section 309, CEQ issued revised NEPA
guidelines in April, 1971. 2 03 CEQ, however, did not use the opportunity to
establish a procedure for receiving or handling environmental referrals from
EPA. 204 Even the more extensive guidelines issued by CEQ in August, 1973
failed to rectify this glaring omission.2 05
EPA, meanwhile, seemed in no particular hurry to implement section
309. It was late 1972 before EPA prescribed formal, detailed guidance
governing section 309 reviews and referrals.206 Under this scheme, EPA
of support the agency receives from the Chief Executive. See RAND & TAWATER, ENvIRON-
MENTAL RFERRALS AND THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 16-17 (Environmental Law
Institute Final Report, Feb., 1986).
202. Healy, supra note 149, at 50,071.
203. CEQ, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment: Guidelines,
36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971) [hereinafter CEQ 1971 Guidelines].
204. See id. In the only reference to § 309, CEQ merely quoted this provision and stated
that EPA's comments under subsection (a) would be sent to CEQ and the responsible federal
agency and would be summarized for the public in a Federal Register notice. See id. at 7725-
26, § 8.
Nevertheless, the guidelines did guarantee "to the maximum extent practicable" that com-
menting agencies would have access to draft EISs at least 90 days prior to final agency action
and access to final statements at least 30 days before final action. Id. at 7726, § 10(b). CEQ
thus had provided all commenting agencies, including EPA, with a more adequate time period
in which to peruse a proposed agency action. The guidelines, moreover, provided that these
two documents had to be made available to the public within the same time periods and that
private citizens and organizations could participate in the commenting process. See id. For a
general discussion of the 1971 revised guidelines, see R. ANDREws, supra note 42, at 33-34.
205. CEQ, Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements: Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§
1500.1-1500.5 (1974) [hereinafter CEQ 1973 Guidelines]. These revised guidelines required
agencies merely to submit relevant proposed actions and EISs to EPA for review pursuant to
§ 309 of the Clean Air Act and § 102(2)(C) of NEPA. See id. at § 1500.9(b). The guidelines,
furthermore, stated that "where EPA determines that proposed agency action is environmentally
unsatisfactory, or where EPA determines that an environmental statement is so inadequate
that such a determination cannot be made, EPA shall publish its determination and notify the
Council as soon as practicable." Id.
The 1973 guidelines were notable, however, for placing some emphasis on NEPA's substantive
policy concerns. For example, the guidelines stressed as an initial matter that impact statements
are not ends in themselves, but are designed to enable agencies to fulfill the policy objectives
of NEPA. See id. § 1500.1(a).
206. EPA MANUAL: REvmw OF FREDERAL AcIoNs IMPACTING Tm ENVIRONMENT (1972)
[hereinafter EPA REvmw MANUAL 197"2]; see also W. RODGERS, supra note 160, at 710-11
(commenting on EPA's "slow start" in implementing § 309); Healy, supra note 149, at 50,079-
80 (discussing the scheme EPA established for performing its § 309 review).
Prior to the promulgation of this formal guidance document, EPA had attempted to fulfill
its § 309 responsibilities in a rather informal, ad hoc manner. See id. at 50,076-79. The process
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would comment on the adequacy of all draft impact statements and also
assess the substantive merits of the underlying projects.2 07 For those state-
ments or projects on which the agency expressed qualms at the draft stage, 20 8
EPA would conduct another evaluation when the final impact statement
was received. 2" At that point, the agency would decide whether the proposed
action or final EIS should be referred to CEQ.210 Not until 1975 did EPA
acknowledge that it had any obligation to oversee federal actions during
the post-EIS period. This revised guidance provided that EPA would monitor
certain questionable projects to determine if the responsible agency had
acted "in an environmentally protective and sound manner. 21 1 Neither this
guidance document nor the CEQ guidelines, however, provided any mech-
anism whereby EPA could challenge an agency whose actual project was
proceeding in an unsatisfactory way. 2 12
The entire review process was thus effectively limited to an evaluation of
how well an agency performed at the procedural stage of NEPA. Did the
EIS adequately analyze a project's impact upon the environment? Was the
project, as described in the statement, environmentally satisfactory? If an
agency's statement passed scrutiny on those two questions, administrative
oversight essentially came to an end. At that point, an agency was perfectly
free to disregard the EIS and take whatever substantive action it desired.
And neither EPA nor CEQ possessed any concrete mechanism for holding
an agency accountable for failing to conform its actions to the substantive
policies of NEPA.
B. A Move in the Right Direction: The 1978 CEQ Regulations
This discontinuity between means and ends, between adequate impact
statements and possibly unsatisfactory results, received no formal govern-
was so informal, in fact, that the only "referral" EPA made during this period (involving the
Trans-Alaska oil pipeline) was apparently never received by CEQ. Id. at 50,077; see also
Anderson, supra note 24, at 271 (characterizing EPA review as "rather haphazard" at this
time).
207. EPA REvmw MANUAL 1972, supra note 206, at ch. 3, 1. EPA's comments on draft
statements would fall into three categories: adequate, insufficient, and inadequate. Comments
on the environmental impact associated with a proposal would also fit into three categories:
lack of objections, environmental reservations, and environmentally unsatisfactory. Id. at ch.
3, 1(c).
208. This group included draft statements thought insufficient or inadequate as well as
projects upon which the agency expressed reservations or which the agency deemed unsatis-
factory. See id. at ch. 3, 4(a).
209. Id.
210. Id. at ch. 3, 4(c).
211. EPA MANUAL: REvIEw oF FEDERAL Ac ONS IACTNG ThE ENviRoNmNT ch. 2, 10
(1975) [hereinafter EPA Ravmw MA.uAL 1975]. Such follow-up was to occur in situations
where EPA, based on its review of a final EIS, had found a project environmentally
unsatisfactory, had expressed environmental reservations, or had determined the final statement
to be unresponsive to earlier comments. Id.
212. See id.; CEQ 1973 Guidelines, supra note 205.
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mental attention until 1978.213 In that year, CEQ, in response to an Executive
Order issued by President Carter, 14 promulgated binding NEPA regula-
tions.215 In the preamble to the regulations, CEQ noted that the previous
guidelines had been remiss in addressing only the procedural requirements
for EISs. As a result of this unfortunate omission, agencies had tended to
view an EIS as "an end in itself, rather than a means to making better
decisions. ' 216 In order to cure this pressing problem, President Carter had
authorized CEQ to expand upon the limited scope of the guidelines and
address, in regulatory fashion, the relationship between the EIS and agency
decisionmaking.2 17
213. The gap between compliance with the procedural means for obtaining cognitive reform-
the EIS-and actually achieving cognitive reform in the context of altered patterns of deci-
sionmaking had received some scholarly attention. See, e.g., R. ANDREws, supra note 42, at
157-58; R. LmoF, supra note 24, at 141. (The author's choice of the term "cognitive reform"
was heavily influenced by Professor Thomas 0. McGarity's use of "cognitive regulatory
reform" to describe attempts to change the way in which agencies "address regulatory
problems." McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. Rav. 253, 260
(1986)).
214. Exec. Order 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978), reprinted at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app., at 1136
(Supp. 1 1977) (amending Exec. Order 11,514, supra note 185) [hereinafter Exec. Order 11,991].
Executive Order 11,991 required CEQ to issue regulations, replacing the earlier guidelines,
in order to implement § 102(2) of NEPA. See id. § 1 (amending Exec. Order 11,514, supra
note 185, § 3(h)). In addition, the President directed CEQ to provide for the referral to CEQ
of conflicts among the agencies concerning the application of NEPA and § 309 of the Clean
Air Act "for the Council's recommendation as to their prompt resolution." Id.
The President's order, moreover, left no doubt that these regulations are binding upon all
federal agencies, except to the extent the regulations are inconsistent with an agency's statutory
obligations. Id. § 2 (adding § 2(g) to Exec. Order 11,514, supra note 185). Thus agencies
could no longer rely on a number of earlier judicial opinions which had viewed CEQ's previous
guidelines as advisory only. See Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1974);
Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 421 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). But cf. cases stating that CEQ guidelines were entitled to
considerable respect: Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164,
1178 (6th Cir. 1972).
215. CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1-1508.28 (1987). For more general treatment of
these regulations, see Fisher, The CEQ Regulations: New Stage in the Evolution of NEPA, 3
HARv. E vnL. L. REv. 347 (1979); McDermott, Improving NEPA: New Regulations of the
Council on Environmental Quality, 8 B.C. ENvTL. AFxms L. Ray. 89 (1979), reprinted in 11
LANi USE & E4vr. L. REv. 21 (1980); Yost, Streamlining NEPA-An Environmental Success
Story, 9 B.C. ENvTL. AnFAms L. Rav. 507 (1981); Comment, Putting Bite in NEPA's Bark:
New Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for the Preparation of Environmental
Impact Statements, 13 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 367 (1980).
216. Preamble to CEQ Regulations, supra note 35, at 55,978.
217. According to CEQ, its authority under the original version of Exec. Order 11,514,
supra note 185, had been confined to the impact statement procedure found in § 102(2)(C) of
NEPA. President Carter's order, however, expanded this authority to include the other planning
and decisionmaking provisions found in § 102(2) of NEPA. See Preamble to CEQ Regulations,
supra note 35, at 55,978.
Section 102(2) contains at least two such provisions. First, § 102(2)(A) requires agencies to
use an interdisciplinary approach in planning and decisionmaking which may affect the
environment. Second, § 102(2)(B) directs agencies to identify and develop procedures which
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CEQ, therefore, designed its regulations to "gear means to ends-to
ensure that the action-forcing procedures of Section 102(2) of NEPA are
used by agencies to fulfill the requirements of the Congressionally mandated
policy set out in Section 101 of the Act." 218 To do this, CEQ devised a
number of procedures which would force agencies to link what they learn
during the EIS process with their substantive decisions.
The new regulations require agencies to produce a "record of decision"
(ROD) for every action involving the preparation of an EIS.219 A ROD is
a public document consisting of three elements. First, an agency must set
forth its final decision. 2  Second, the agency must identify every alternative
course of action which the agency had considered and designate which of
those alternatives was thought preferable from an environmental perspec-
tive. 221 The agency must include a discussion of all of the non-environmental
factors-technical, economic, or policy concerns-which played a role in
the agency's decision. 2m Finally, an agency must state whether every feasible
precaution to avoid or lessen environmental harm had been adopted, and
if not, why not.22
By mandating the preparation of such a decision document, CEQ effec-
tively forces an agency to review its impact statement and to pay particular
attention to the most environmentally sound way in which to proceed.n If,
for some reason, an agency does not choose that course of action, it must
articulate some rationale which reveals how the consideration of other
ensure that environmental values are given "appropriate consideration" in agency decision-
making. The President certainly has the constitutional authority to see that these provisions,
as well as § 102(2)(C), are faithfully executed. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3. Moreover, he
possesses the statutory authority to delegate that authority to CEQ. See 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1982);
see also Preamble to CEQ Regulations, supra note 35, at 55,978 (setting forth the constitutional
and statutory authority for President Carter's issuance of the Executive Order).
218. Preamble to CEQ Regulations, supra note 35, at 55,980.
219. See CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (1987). This "concise public record of
decision" may be incorporated into any other decisionmaking record which an agency generates.
Id.
220. Id. § 1505.2(a).
221. Id. § 1505.2(b). CEQ explained that the environmentally preferred alternative is that
alternative (or alternatives) "which best promotes the national environmental policy as expressed
in Section 101 of NEPA . . . ." Preamble to CEQ Regulations, supra note 35, at 55,986.
222. See CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(b) (1987).
223. Id. § 1505.2(c). Wherever "applicable," an agency shall also adopt and summarize a
"monitoring and enforcement program" for necessary mitigation measures. Id.
224. This result is reinforced by the existence of two other regulatory requirements. First,
CEQ explicitly directed agencies to establish procedures which guarantee that an impact
statement and other relevant environmental documents, including comments, "accompany the
proposal through existing agency review processes so that agency officials use the statement
in making decisions." Id. § 1505.1(d). Furthermore, CEQ explicitly prescribed the use of these
environmental documents. An agency, therefore, must establish procedures which (a) require
a decisionmaker to consider the alternatives presented in the EIS and (b) ensure that the
alternatives considered by the decisionmaker "are encompassed by the range of alternatives"
presented in the relevant environmental documents. Id. § 1505.1(e).
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factors tipped the balance in favor of a less desirable alternative.2 More-
over, an agency must explore measures designed to mitigate any environ-
mental damage that might result from the agency's decision. 226
Having attempted to ensure that agencies integrate environmental values
into their decisionmaking process, CEQ then turned its attention to ensuring
that agencies actually perform whatever environmentally protective measures
are found necessary. The regulations thus require agencies to implement the
mitigation and other conditions identified in the EIS or during the review
process which are, in fact, adopted in the ROD.227
CEQ thereby created a rather comprehensive system for relating the
information and insights provided by an EIS to actual agency processes for
decision and action. 228 The ROD, furthermore, provides other arms of the
225. One commentator has criticized this aspect of the ROD as a watered-down version of
what CEQ had originally proposed. See Comment, supra note 215, at 401-02. The proposed
rule would have required an agency, whenever relevant, to explain "why" other policy concerns
"overrode" the selection of the environmentally preferable alternative. Proposed CEQ Regu-
lations, 43 Fed. Reg. 25,230, 25,240 (1978) (proposing 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(b)). The final rule,
in contrast, forces an agency to "identify and discuss" all the factors including "essential
considerations of national policy" that entered into its decision and "state how" those factors
affected the decision. CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(b) (1987). The final rule seems to
require the same kind of reasoning as the proposal would have, except that the word
"overrode," to which some commenters had objected, was removed and replaced with less
normative language. See Preamble to CEQ Regulations, supra note 35, at 55,986.
226. See CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(c) (1987). This particular requirement
dovetails nicely with CEQ's rules pertaining to the preparation of an impact statement. Those
rules direct agencies to discuss appropriate mitigation measures with regard to the proposed
action and identified alternatives. See id. §§ 1502.14(0, 1502.16(h) (1987). The rules define
"mitigation" to include:
(a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an
action.
(b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its
implementation.
(c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected
environment.
(d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance
operations during the life of the action.
(e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources
or environments.
Id. § 1508.20 (1987).
227. Id. § 1505.3 (1987). CEQ left the establishment of a monitoring program to determine
whether the contents of the ROD, including mitigation provisions, are implemented to the
discretion of the agencies. See id. However, CEQ does require agencies to:
(a) Include appropriate conditions in grants, permits or other approvals.
(b) Condition funding of actions on mitigation.
(c) Upon request, inform cooperating or commenting agencies on progress in
carrying out mitigation measures which they have proposed and which were
adopted by the agency making the decision.(d) Upon request, make available to the public the results of relevant monitoring.
Id.
228. As CEQ explained elsewhere in the regulations, the purpose of NEPA, after all, "is
not to generate paperwork-even excellent paperwork-but to foster excellent action. The
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executive branch, such as EPA and CEQ, as well as Congress and the
public with an indication of whether the NEPA process is producing
decisions which further national environmental policies. 229
Although the preparation of a record makes agency decisions susceptible
to review by EPA and, if necessary, by CEQ, the regulations provide no
mechanism for doing so. This omission is curious in view of the tremendous
emphasis the Council placed on the record as an "essential" link in the
"effective implementation of NEPA."2' 0 It is also curious because CEQ
used the 1978 regulations as an opportunity to create an elaborate process
for the referral and review of interagency disputes concerning the imple-
mentation of NEPA.
Building upon interim guidance issued in 1977, 231 CEQ's regulations
establish a precise mechanism for receiving and handling environmental
referrals. The regulations recognize EPA's duty to review certain federal
actions, including those for which an EIS is prepared, and to refer any
action which EPA finds environmentally unsatisfactory. 232 In addition, the
regulations authorize referrals from other federal agencies where an agency,
after reviewing an EIS, determines that the proposed action involves un-
acceptable environmental consequences.? 3 CEQ, nevertheless, encourages
agencies to avoid the necessity of a referral by entering into consultation
with the action agency as early as possible to try to resolve their differ-
ences. 234 However, if those efforts prove futile, the regulations require a
referral 235 to be delivered to CEQ within twenty-five days after the final
EIS is made available to EPA, the commenting agencies, and the public.? 6
NEPA process is intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on under-
standing of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance
the environment." Id. § 1500.1(c) (1987). Therefore, an EIS "shall be used by federal officials
in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions." Id. § 1502.1
(1987).
229. See Comment, Implementation of the Environmental Impact Statement, 88 YALE L.J.
596, 603 (1979).
230. Preamble to CEQ Regulations, supra note 35, at 55,985.
231. 42 Fed. Reg. 61,066 (1977) (reprinting a memorandum from the chairman of the
Council to all agency heads setting forth interim guidance on the referral of unsatisfactory
actions to CEQ). The memorandum was intended to guide the referral process until the
adoption of substantive regulations. Id. at 61,067.
232. See CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1504.1(b) (1987).
233. See id. § 1504.1(c).
234. See id. § 1504.2. In addition, CEQ requires an agency to advise the action agency "at
the earliest possible time that it intends to refer a matter to the Council unless a satisfactory
agreement is reached." Id. Vl504.3(a)(l). Such advice must be incorporated into the agency's
comments on the draft EIS if the statement is adequate enough to allow an assessment of the
project's acceptability. Id. § 1504.3(a)(2).
235. In deciding whether to refer a particular project, the regulations urge an agency to
evaluate the "potential adverse environmental impacts" from six perspectives:
(a) Possible violatioi of national environmental standards or policies.(b) Severity.
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The entire referral process, consequently, revolves around the merits of a
final impact statement and the action it proposes. 23 7
Upon receiving such a pre-decisional referral and any response from the
action agency,238 CEQ may take one or more of a number of actions. The
Council may, for example, consult with the concerned agencies for the
purpose of mediation, convene public meetings, issue findings and recom-
mendations, or even submit the matter to the President. 9 On the other
hand, CEQ may simply drop the matter if it determines that the issue
presented "is not one of national importance . . . ."m
Between 1974 and 1985, 241 a total of twenty-two referrals was made to
CEQ.Z42 Most of these referrals, fourteen in fact, were filed by EPA, while
(c) Geographical scope.
(d) Duration.
(e) Importance as precedents.
(f) Availability of environmentally preferable alternatives.
Id. § 1504.2.
236. Id. 1504.3(b). Unless the action agency grants an extension of this time period, the
Council will refuse to entertain a late referral. Id.
The referral must contain a copy of a letter from the head of the referring agency to the
action agency informing that agency of the referral and requesting the deferral of action until
the Council acts. Id. § 1504.3(c)(1). The letter must set forth a statement of the agency's
rationale, incorporating references to supporting factual evidence, for finding the project
environmentally unsatisfactory. Id. § 1504.3(c)(2). The statement also must include, inter alia,
the identification of any environmental requirements or policies which the project would
violate, id. § 1504.3(c)(2)(ii), a finding as to whether the referral raises an issue of "national
importance," id. § 1504.3(c)(2)(iv), and "recommendations as to what mitigation alternative,
further study, or other course of action (including abandonment of the matter) are necessary
to remedy the situation," id. § 1504.3(c)(2)(vi).
237. See, e.g., CEQ Forty Most Asked Questions, supra note 34, at 18,036 (stating in the
answer to question 33a that the "Council's referral procedure is a pre-decision referral process
for interagency disagreements") (emphasis in orginal).
238. The action agency has 25 days within which to respond to the referral. CEQ Regulations,
40 C.F.R. § 1504.3(d) (1987). CEQ may grant the action agency an extension provided it gives
an "assurance that the matter will not go forward in the interim." Id.
239. See id. § 1504.3(f)(2), (3), (6), (7).
240. Id. § 1504.3(f)(4). The Council may also find that "the process of referral and response
has successfully resolved the problem," id. § 1504.3(f)(1), or return the matter to the concerned
agencies for further negotiation, see id. § 1504.3(f)(5).
241. All nine referrals filed prior to 1978 were from EPA. See CouNcr. ON ENvm. QuAuT=,
FIFTEENTH ANN. REP. 527 (1984) [hereinafter CEQ 15th ANNuAL REPORT]. Those filed before
the issuance of interim CEQ guidance in 1977, see supra note 231 and accompanying text,
were presumably handled by CEQ on an informal, case-by-case basis, see Current Develop-
ments, 8 Env't Rep. (BNA) 582 (Aug. 19, 1977).
242. See CEQ 15th AN u-L REPORT, supra note 241, at 5F6-28. Since 1985, CEQ has
received at least one additional referral. See Department of Housig and Urban Development-
Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1989, Pt. 1: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 686-87 (1988) (describing the recent
referral from the Department of the Interior challenging the Navy's proposal to establish a




the Department of the Interior was responsible for six more.2 3 The range
of issues presented to CEQ2" have run from the preservation of national
parks, forests, and seashoresus to the protection of air and water resources. 246
The concern that has most frequently arisen, however, has been the pres-
ervation of wetlands-from mangrove swamps to bottomland hardwoods.2 7
The referral process has often succeeded in prompting serious negotiations
between the contending agencies.2 8 During these negotiations, CEQ has
sometimes assumed the role of mediator, assisting the parties, for example,
in narrowing the scope of issues in dispute.us At other times, or after
attempts at mediation have failed, the Council has become an advocate,
issuing recommendations designed to achieve a better accomodation of
environmental values.uo Perhaps surprisingly, the action agencies have gen-
erally accepted the recommendations of the Council even though they are
not binding. 251 This "clout" has resulted from the Council's position in the
Executive Office of the President22 and from the perception that the Council
possesses a highly competent and objective staff.253
The formal referral process has thus been a relatively effective mechanism
for resolving predecisional disputes in an environmentally sensitive fashion.
While it remains a seldom-used tool, considering the thousands of proposals
243. See CEQ 15th ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 241, at 527-28. The Department of the
Interior also joined EPA in referring a dispute involving an airport expansion in Jackson
Hole, Wyoming. See id. at 528, 551. The Department of Defense and the Advisory Council
on Historic Preservation each filed one referral. See id. at 528.
244. For a brief summary of these referrals, see id. at 528-60; RAND & TAWATER, supra
note 201, 22 app.
245. EPA and the Department of the Interior, for example, objected to an expansion of an
airport in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, due to noise impacts on the Grand Teton National Park.
See RAND & TAWATER, supra note 201, 22 app. at 32-33. EPA also referred a proposal to
issue phosphate mining leases in the Osceola National Forest in Northern Florida, see id. 22
app. at 1-3, and the Department of the Interior opposed a beach restoration plan due, in part,
to adverse impacts upon the Fire Island National Seashore, see id. 22 app. at 21-22.
246. For instance, EPA referred a proposal to permit a marine terminal at the mouth of
the Wando River in South Carolina because the project would, among other things, degrade
water quality, see id. 22 app. at 13-14, and EPA's objection to the Westside Highway
(Westway) in New York City grew out of the use of a "flawed" air quality model, see id. 22
app. at 9-10.
247. A total of nine referrals involved wetlands, at least in part. See id. 22 app. at 7, 11-
12, 13-14, 15-16, 17-18, 23-25, 26-29, 34-36, 44-46. These referrals included EPA's opposition
to the issuance of dredge and fill permits which would have authorized the destruction of
2,200 acres of mangrove habitat at Marco Island, Florida, id. 22 app. at 7, and the Department
of the Interior's referral of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway for an "inadequate" plan to
mitigate the loss of 34,000 acres of hardwood wetlands, id. 22 app. at 44-46.
248. See id. at 12.
249. See id. Through the efforts of CEQ, the heads of the respective agencies often became
aware for the first time that a particular controversy existed. Id.
250. See id. at 12-15.
251. See id. at 15.
252. See id. at 16.
253. See id. at 15-18.
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that lie within its potential ambit,2-4 numbers alone belie its significance.
The mere possibility of an eventual referral has encouraged moderation and
compromise. Regardless of whether agencies are trying to avoid adverse
publicity or scrutiny by CEQ (and, perhaps, by White House staffers),25
the spectre of a referral has indeed induced action agencies to consider
more seriously the objections posed by commenting agencies and even to
accept more environmentally acceptable alternatives. 6 Agencies, however,
254. See id. at 7. The fact that CEQ may refuse to consider a referral that fails to present
a matter of "national importance," see supra note 240 and accompanying text, has undoubtedly
contributed to the low number of referrals. See RAND & TAWATER, supra note 201, at 7.
Although CEQ has seemingly used the "national importance" criterion to weed out referrals
presenting politically charged, but environmentally significant issues, see generally id. 22 app.
at 42-43 (discussing the referral of the Presidential Parkway project in Atlanta, Georgia), the
standard, if properly applied, appears an appropriate method for husbanding the limited
resources of CEQ. Cf. id. at 7 (speculating on the rationale for "this important limitation on
CEQ jurisdiction").
An agency may also be reluctant to press a referral against a project with strong support
within the administration. See generally 2 NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNcr., DECISION MAKING IN
rIM ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 153 (1977) (discussing EPA's approach to the then-
proposed liquid metal fast breeder reactor).
255. In one referral, CEQ explicitly threatened to involve the White House if the action
agency did not revise its proposal. See RAND & TAWATER, supra note 201, 22 app. at 21-22
(summarizing the referral of the Corps of Engineers' proposal to rebuild the beach along the
southern coast of Long Island).
256. See id. at 8, 14 (basing these conclusions upon extensive interviews with individuals
who have been involved in the referral process); see also 2 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 254, at 153 (observing that EPA oversight has served "to deter other federal
agencies from making only a token effort toward environmental assessment"). The prophylactic
value of a threatened referral is well illustrated by one example with which the author had
some involvement during his service as a regional lawyer with EPA.
The Army Corps of Engineers had initially refused to prepare an EIS for the issuance of a
permit which was a necessary precondition to the construction of a 30,000 barrel-per-day oil
refinery near Georgetown, South Carolina. ARMY CoRPs OF ENGINEERs, FINDING OF No
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT, APPLICATION BY CAROLINA REFINING AND DISTRIBUTING COMPANY TO
INSTALL A SUBAQUEOUS PIPELINE ACROSS THE SAMPrr RIVER, NEAR GEORGETOWN, SOUTH
CAROLINA (1983). Concerned by the refinery's "potential adverse impact on water quality and
the ecology of Winyah Bay," EPA Region IV prepared a referral package seeking the
preparation of an EIS for this project. See Memorandum from Charles R. Jeter, Regional
Administrator, to Acting Director of EPA's Office of Federal Activities (May 2, 1983) (on
file with author). Winyah Bay is a large, shallow estuary which is surrounded by undeveloped
marshes and a number of wildlife sanctuaries. See EPA, SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR THE REFERRAL
OF THE CHARLESTON CORPS OF ENGINEERS' DECISION NOT TO PREPARE AN ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT ON CAROLINA REFINING AND DISTRmUTING COMPANY's GEORGETOWN REFIN-
ERY 1-2 (undated). (For a delightful mystery story set along the pristine shores of Winyah
Bay, see Elliott Roosevelt's Murder at Hobcaw Barony (1986)).
Prior to the delivery of the referral package to CEQ, however, the Corps of Engineers
relented and began to prepare a full-blown EIS. See 49 Fed. Reg. 47,924 (1984) (recounting
the Memorandum of Agreement between EPA and the Corps concerning the preparation of
an EIS for this proposed project). When the Corps issued its final EIS announcing its intention
to issue the necessary permit, EPA again threatened to refer the matter to CEQ, citing among
other things, the risk of oil spills in the bay. See id. The Corps eventually backed down once
more and, this time, denied the permit because Winyah Bay is, in the words of the Corps, a
"truly unique environment" worthy of preservation. Current Developments, 15 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1478-79 (Jan. 11, 1985).
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do not face the sobering prospect of a referral when it comes to making
final decisions.
The referral system, as established by CEQ, is largely geared to the
production of better environmental information documents rather than
better decisions. Once an agency has identified an environmentally satisfac-
tory proposal within its final EIS, the threat of referral ends257 despite the
fact that no agency is bound to adopt that particular proposal in its ROD.
258
Consequently, neither EPA nor any other federal agency possesses a formal
mechanism for challenging the environmental rectitude of an action agency's
final decision. Although this result may well be appropriate for agencies
that are merely authorized to comment on an EIS, 219 EPA's duties under
section 309 of the Clean Air Act go beyond the scope of an environmental
impact statement. 260
EPA, in fact, has continued to acknowledge at least some responsibility
to review how well agencies perform after filing a final EIS. Under revised
guidelines issued in 1984,261 EPA may, on a selective basis, 262 monitor an
agency's record of decision to determine whether the agency has incorporated
257. Referrals must be filed within 25 days after a final EIS becomes available. CEQ
Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1504.3(b) (1987). The ROD setting forth the agency's final decision,
however, may not be issued until the thirtieth day after the final EIS becomes available. See
id. § 1506.10(b). Even if an action agency has granted an extension of time for another agency
to process a referral, the ROD may not be issued until the extension has expired. CEQ Forty
Most Asked Questions, supra note 34, at 18,036 (answer to question 33b). It is, therefore,
impossible to file a referral following the issuance of a ROD. See id. (stating that no referrals
may be made once a ROD has been issued).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 219-25.
259. See NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
260. See infra text accompanying notes 337-44.
261. EPA, POLICY AND PRocEmmUS FOR THE REviEw OF FEDERAL AcTONs IMPACTING THE
EmrmoNgmEr (1984) [hereinafter EPA Rnvmw PoLIcY AND PROCEDURES 1984].
This guidance document revised, to a certain extent, the agency's previous system for
reviewing and rating draft EISs. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (describing the
system which was subsequently incorporated into the EPA REviEw MAuAL 1975, supra note
211, at ch. 3, 1(c)). With regard to environmental impact, the agency will place a project,
as described in the draft statement, in one of four categories: (1) lack of objections, (2)
environmental concerns, (3) environmental objections, or (4) environmentally unsatisfactory.
EPA REvrEw POLICY AND PROCEDURES 1984, supra, at ch. 4, 4(a). The agency also will
determine whether the draft statement (1) is adequate, (2) contains insufficient information,
or (3) is inadequate. Id. at ch. 4, 4(b).
Whereas EPA's prior practice was to review final EISs only for certain projects, see supra
notes 208-09 and accompanying text (discussing the practice which was later adopted by the
EPA REvIEw MANUAL 1975, supra note 211, at ch. 3, 4(a)), the current guidance suggests
that EPA will review all final statements, see EPA REviEw PoucY AND PROCEDUREs 1984,
supra, at ch. 6. EPA, however, reserves "detailed review[s]" for projects rated environmentally
objectionable or environmentally unsatisfactory at the draft stage and for statements which
were rated inadequate in draft form. Id. at ch. 6, 1.
262. EPA Ravmw PoLIcY AND PROCEDIRES 1984, supra note 261, at ch. 7, 1 (setting
forth EPA policy), 3(a) (stating that EPA personnel "should" review a ROD for final
impact statements "on which the EPA has expressed environmental objections, and/or those
where the EPA has negotiated mitigation measures or changes in project design").
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any mitigation measures previously agreed upon with EPA.263 Where an
action agency fails to incorporate agreed upon mitigation in its decision,
EPA's recourse is to bring the problem to the action agency's attention.264
The limitations of EPA's post-EIS procedures are obvious. Not only is
EPA review totally discretionary, but it focuses upon one narrow issue:
Has the action agency executed its mitigation agreement with EPA? More-
over, if the action agency proves recalcitrant, EPA lacks the one tool that
has proven effective in encouraging agencies to compromise-the threat of
a formal referral to the CEQ. Neither EPA nor CEQ, therefore, have fully
met their respective obligations under section 309 of the Clean Air Act.
III. THu LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
While NEPA represents an ambitious attempt to reform and redirect
federal planning and decisionmaking, the Act does not preempt the deci-
sionmaking authority possessed by federal agencies. The Act, however, does
seek to ensure that those decisions are fully informed and guided by generally
stated environmental values. The ultimate balancing of those environmental
values with other economic or social values is a matter delegated by Congress
to the good faith and expertise of the executive branch.265
The federal judiciary has thus been reluctant to review the substantive
merits of federal decisions which are "informed" by adequat6 EISs. As
long as an agency has complied with the procedural requirements of NEPA,
the courts appear an unlikely source of support for a litigant who challenges
the environmental wisdom of a particular agency decision. Such a litigant,
however, does possess two avenues of attack, both procedural, for problems
that might arise after the filing of a satisfactory EIS.
Although a project's description in an EIS cannot be viewed as binding,
any mitigation measures adopted in an agency's ROD appear to be enforce-
able commitments. Moreover, if the agency's actual action diverges signif-
icantly from the picture of the proposed action contained in the EIS, a
263. Id. at ch. 7, 2(a)(2). As a follow-up to such a review, EPA personnel are instructed
to "ensure" that the action agency "has included all agreed upon [mitigation] measures as
conditions in grants, permits, or other approvals, where appropriate." Id. at ch. 7, 2(a)(3).
Furthermore, EPA staff is encouraged, where resources permit, "to assess the level of
compliance . . . of Federal agency mitigation measures." Id. at ch. 7, 2(c).
264. Id. at ch. 7, 3(b). If a problem remains unresolved after bringing it to the attention
of the action agency, the matter "should be coordinated" with that agency's headquarters
and, "if appropriate," with CEQ. Id.
EPA's guidance is silent as to any response for a situation in which an action agency either
fails to directly implement agreed-upon mitigation or fails to impose agreed-upon mitigation
as conditions of grants, permits, or other approvals. See id. at ch. 7.
265. See, e.g., L. CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 1; Note, EIS Supplements for Improperly




court might well order the preparation of a supplemental EIS. Both reme-
dies, of course, suffer from the fact that they are procedural in nature. A
court will neither force an agency to incorporate appropriate mitigation in
a ROD nor compel an agency, following the preparation of a supplement,
to adopt a more environmentally satisfactory course of action. In addition,
a project modification which is less than significant or, perhaps in some
circuits, less than sweeping, will not even trigger the duty to supplement an
existing EIS.
A. The Substantive Enforcement of NEPA
The federal courts have long made a crucial distinction between the
procedural obligations imposed by NEPA and the Act's substantive com-
ponent. In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission,265 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the procedural duties of section 102 were subject to a
"strict standard of compliance."267 In contrast, the court construed the
substantive policy of NEPA as "flexible" leaving "room for a responsible
exercise of discretion."7 61 Judge Skelly Wright, nevertheless, indicated in
dictum that this discretion was not unfettered. Consequently, a reviewing
court "probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on its merits, under
section 101, unless it be shown that the actual balance of costs and benefits
that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environ-
mental values." 269 A number of appellate courts subsequently echoed the
suggestion in Calvert Cliffs' that there was indeed some room for substantive
judicial review of an agency's actual decision.270
The Supreme Court, however, has apparently laid this notion to rest. In
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,21 the Court held that
266. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
267. Id. at 1112.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1115.
270. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of the United States
Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1139-40 (5th Cir. 1974) (decided on other grounds); Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 1973) (concluding that the agency's decision was neither
arbitrary nor capricious); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of the United
States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 297-301 (8th Cir. 1972) (same), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
Contra Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974); National Helium Corp. v.
Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1971).
This issue prompted lively discussion in the legal literature. See, e.g., Briggs, NEPA as a
Means to Preserve and Improve the Environment-The Substantive Review, 15 B.C. INMus.
& CoM. L. REv. 699 (1974); Cohen & Warren, Judicial Recognition of the Substantive
Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. IlNus. & COm. L.
Rav. 685 (1972); Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review under
NEPA, 88 HAIv. L. Rayv. 735 (1975).
271. 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam). Prior to the Second Circuit's decision, no court had
invalidated an agency decision as arbitrary or capricious under NEPA. J. BoNmDM & T.
McGAUTY, supra note 2, at 207.
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the Second Circuit had erred in setting aside an administrative decision for
failing to give certain environmental factors controlling weight.272 In doing
so, the Court stated that while NEPA establishes "significant substantive
goals for the Nation," the judicially enforceable duties that it imposes upon
agencies are "essentially procedural. ' 273 A reviewing court, therefore, may
not require an agency to "elevate environmental concerns over other ap-
propriate considerations." 274 Rather, as long as an agency has complied
with NEPA's procedural requirements, a court "cannot 'interject itself
within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action
to be taken."' 27 5
The Court thus relegated judicial review under NEPA to "the essentially
mindless task of determining whether an agency 'considered' environmental
factors even if that agency may have effectively decided to ignore those
factors in reaching its conclusion. ' 276 Despite the breadth of the Court's
272. Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 226-28.
273. Id. at 227 (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 227-28 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)). The
Court's conclusion may well be appropriate since NEPA provides no real guidance for weighing
environmental values with other essential policy goals. See supra note 28 and accompanying
text; Comment, supra note 229, at 602. After all, § 101 declares that federal agencies must
"use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy,"
to further the environmental goals set forth in the Act. NEPA § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)
(1982) (emphasis added).
276. Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Some commentators, on the
other hand, have argued that the Supreme Court did not eliminate the possibility of substantivejudicial review to determine whether an agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious. See
Liebesman, The Council on Environmental Quality's Regulations to Implement the National
Environmental Policy Act-Will They Further NEPA's Substantive Mandate?, 10 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,039, 50,041-42 (1980); Comment, Charting the Boundaries of NEPA's
Substantive Mandate: Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 10 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,039, 10,043-44 (1980). These commentators have relied upon a footnote in
Strycker's Bay which states that had the Second Circuit found the agency's decision arbitrary,
plenary review might have been available. See Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 228 n.2. Instead,
the Second Circuit had erred by elevating "environmental concerns over other, admittedly
legitimate, considerations." Id.
Such a reading of Strycker's Bay appears strained. If the Court was referring to the question
of substantive NEPA review, it was wrong. The Second Circuit had concluded that the agency
had acted arbitrarily by selecting an alternative which would present adverse and avoidable
environmental impacts. See Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub
nom. Stryker's Bay, 444 U.S. 223; see also Goldsmith & Banks, supra note 24, at 10-I1
(arguing to the same effect). Furthermore, if the Court had really believed that room existed
for review based upon the arbitrary and capricious standard, "giving environmental concerns
no more, but no less, weight than they deserve," id. at 11, the Court should have remanded
the case for further findings. In fact, the Court may have been been referring to the district
court's holding that the agency's implementation of the procedural requirements of § 102 was
not arbitrary, a holding which was left undisturbed by the Second Circuit. See Trinity Episcopal
School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Karlen v.
Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (1978), rev'd sub nom. Stryker's Bay, 444 U.S. 223. Until such time as
the Court has an opportunity to clarify this ambiguity, the author chooses to rely upon Justice
Marshall's characterization of Strycker's Bay and the clear language of its text.
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approach, it may not have precluded a very narrow form of substantive
review. At least one appellate opinion rendered after Strycker's Bay has
held that an agency, in making its substantive decision, must consider the
environmental consequences of its action in "good faith." 277 Good faith
consideration alone, however, does not necessarily yield a decision which
reflects an appropriate weighing of environmental values. 278 Provided an
agency has disclosed and "considered" the environmental harm its project
may cause, it appears free to unleash the resulting damage without the
troublesome prospect of probing judicial inquiry.279
B. Enforcing Agency "Commitments"
It should come as no surprise, considering the judicial reluctance to review
an agency's substantive decision, that the courts have refused to enforce
"commitments" found in an EIS. 20 However misleading representations
contained in an EIS may seem when viewed in light of actual agency
277. Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1072 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding
specifically that a "court should only assure itself that the agency has given good faith
consideration to the environmental consequences of its actions and should not pass judgment
on the balance struck by the agency among competing concerns"). For cases stating that
substantive review is limited to a determination of whether there had been good faith
consideration of environmental consequences, see Wade v. Lewis, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 913, 946
(N.D. Ill. 1983); Pennsylvania Protect Our Water and Envt. Resources, Inc. v. Appalachian
Regional Comm'n, 574 F. Supp. 1203, 1212-13 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Citizens Comm. Against
Interstate Route 675, Inc. v. Lewis, 542 F. Supp. 496, 530-31 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
278. Other courts have held that the "consideration" required by Strycker's Bay may be
satisfied by completion of an adequate EIS. See Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 184-85
(7th Cir. 1982); Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981). See
also Weinstein, Substantive Review under NEPA after Vermont Yankee IV, 36 SYRAcusE L.
REv. 837, 852-53 (1985) (concluding that these courts, while purporting to review the merits,
never actually reach the merits).
279. An agency would likely be able to demonstrate good faith substantive consideration of
environmental consequences by producing the agency's ROD. That document, if properly
done, will specify all of the alternatives considered by the agency, including the environmentally
preferable one, and will discuss how various policy factors entered into its ultimate decision.
CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(b) (1987); see supra notes 219-23 and accompanying
text.
280. See Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 644 F.2d 434, 435 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding that NEPA does not create a private right of action to enforce noise levels
specified in an EIS), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981); City of Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596
F.2d 709, 712-13 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that a cause of action does not exist to enjoin a
federal agency from breaching a provision in an EIS); Mountainbrook Homeowners Ass'n v.
Adams, 492 F. Supp. 521, 529 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (holding that plaintiffs cannot maintain a
cause of action to enforce an EIS provision indicating that a pile of debris would be contoured
and seeded), aff'd mem., 620 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1980). See generally, Comment, Enforcing
the "Commitments" Made in Impact Statements: A Proposed Passage Through a Thicket of




performance, 21 the fact remains that those representations do not amount
to enforceable duties. As the CEQ regulations amply demonstrate, an EIS
is simply a planning document which is intended to inform the ultimate
decisionmaker. 282 Therefore, any attempt to enforce a mitigation measure
or any other condition found in an EIS is, in reality, an effort to force a
particular decision upon an agency by transforming a planning tool into a
final decision. If any document generated during the NEPA process could
give rise to such an action for enforcement, it would have to be an agency's
ROD.
While CEQ has expressed its belief that "the terms of a ROD are
enforceable by. . .private parties, '283 the regulations promulgated by CEQ
reveal that the enforceable duties arising from a record of decision are more
circumscribed. The regulations do not direct an agency to implement every
aspect of a decision. Rather, CEQ chose only to require an agency to
perform the "mitigation . . . and other conditions" identified during the
EIS process and adopted in the agency's decision. 2 4 A court, consequently,
could find a failure to implement such mitigation a breach of an agency's
legal duty and order the agency to comply.
285
281. City of Blue Ash, 596 F.2d 709, involved an especially egregious example of an agency
turning its back on an impact-reducing representation contained in its EIS. The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) had prepared an EIS for its funding of an airport expansion
in suburban Cincinnati. The EIS indicated that, due to public opposition, jet aircraft would
be barred from using the renovated facility. Soon after the project was completed, however,
the FAA reversed itself and declared that certain types of jets would, in fact, be granted access
to the airport. Id. at 710-11.
282. See supra notes 216-28 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 215, at
402 n.206 (stating that an EIS is an information document which "focuses on the process of
assessment," whereas a decision document "focuses on the process of choice").
283. CEQ Forty Most Asked Questions, supra note 34, at 18,037 (answer to question 34d).
Since this document was not promulgated as a substantive rule, it is not binding law. See,
e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1044 (1986);
Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678,
682 (D.C. Cir. 1982). An agency's interpretation of its own regulation, however, is entitled to
substantial deference "unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410,
414 (1944). See also Cabinet Mountains, 685 F.2d at 682-83 (finding a portion of the Forty
Questions unpersuasive because, in its view, CEQ had strayed from the realm of interpretation
and had attempted to impose requirements not found in the NEPA regulations).
284. CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3 (1987); see supra note 227 and accompanying
text.
285. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a federal court possesses the authority to
"hold unlawful" agency action which is "not in accordance with law," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(1982), and to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed," id. §
706(1).
CEQ has taken this position as well stating that "A Record of Decision can be used to
compel compliance with or execution of the mitigation measures identified therein." CEQ
Forty Most Asked Questions, supra note 34, at 18,037 (answer to question 34d). To facilitate
the enforcement of these requirements, the CEQ regulations instruct an agency to include the
details of the mitigation measures as conditions of funding, permitting or granting of other
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An agency, however, has no duty to adopt mitigation measures or other
impact reducing conditions in its ROD.26 As a result, a potential litigant
may find little to enforce. Moreover, a citizen will likely be unaware of
whether an agency has ever performed its obligations to mitigate environ-
mental damage.2 7 And even if one becomes aware of an implementation
failure, the discovery may come so late in the process that a suit cannot be
brought until after the project has been completed. 28 In such a case, a
court might be inclined to dismiss the action for mootness2 9 or to deny
injunctive relief on account of laches. 2 90
C. Supplemental Impact Statements
The entire efficacy of the EIS process is called into question when changes
are made to a project after the publication of a final impact statement.
approvals when a private party or a subordinate governmental entity is actually responsible
for the action. See CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3(a)-(b) (1987). However, if the federal
agency is to carry out the project, the Forty Questions state that "the Record of Decision
should delineate the mitigation . . . measures in sufficient detail to constitute an enforceable
commitment, or incorporate by reference the portions of the EIS that do so." CEQ Forty
Most Asked Questions, supra note 34, at 18,036-37 (answer to question 34c).
286. The regulations merely provide that a ROD must "[s]tate whether all practicable means
to avoid or minimize environmental harm . . . have been adopted, and if not, why they were
not." CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(c) (1987). That language certainly does not suggest
a mandatory duty to adopt appropriate mitigation in a record of decision. See Comment,
supra note 229, at 603-04 (discussing the identical provision in the proposed regulations). Cf.
Comment, supra note 215, at 398 (attempting to show that it is unclear whether or not the
regulations impose a duty to adopt mitigation).
287. Cf. Note, supra note 265, at 229 (suggesting the difficulties involved in monitoring
post-EIS modifications to a particular project).
288. Cf. id. (discussing EIS enforcement cases).
289. A number of courts have declared NEPA actions moot where a challenged project has
been largely or entirely completed. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Appalachian Regional
Comm'n, 677 F.2d 883, 891-92 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that post completion relief "would
be a vain attempt to inform decisionmaking past"); Florida Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt,
611 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that a court cannot "undo what has already been
done"); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Bergland, 576 F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1978) (same).
In many cases, however, mitigation could be performed without the necessity of undoing what
has been done. For example, an agency could be ordered to fulfill its commitment to acquire
off-site wetlands to replace those destroyed by the construction of a dam or canal. In such
an instance, a plaintiffs claim is not truly moot. Post-completion remedies, moreover, may
be available where an agency has acted in bad faith. See Richland Park Homeowners Ass'n
v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1982); Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243,
246 (1st Cir. 1977).
290. Laches could be applied if it were demonstrated that there was "a delay in asserting
a right or claim, that the delay was not excusable and that there was undue prejudice to the
party against whom the claim is asserted." Ecology Center of Louisiana, Inc. v. Coleman,
515 F.2d 860, 867 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Michigan v. City of Allen Park, 501 F. Supp.
1007, 1016-17 (E.D. Mich. 1980); East 63d Street Ass'n v. Coleman, 414 F. Supp. 1318, 1330
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). On the other hand, some courts have indicated that the defense of laches is
not altogether favored in the context of NEPA litigation. See, e.g., Preservation Coalition,
Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 854-55 (9th Cir. 1982); Minnesota Public Interest Research Group
v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1324 (8th Cir. 1974); Watershed Associates Rescue v. Alexander, 586
F. Supp. 978, 984-86 (D. Neb. 1982); see also D. MANDELKER, supra note 9, at § 4:26.
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Such changes frequently occur due to the passage of time and the difficulties
faced by an agency when confronted with the actual construction of a large,
complex project. 29' Such changes may also result from the temptation to
promise more in an EIS-mitigation measures, for instance-than the agency
really intends to implement in order to defuse public or governmental
criticism.292 Since an agency cannot be compelled to abide by its EIS
"commitments," a litigant concerned about a project modification is left
with one possible option: seek a supplemental environmental statement.
The text of NEPA makes no reference to such a supplement. For a
number of years, however, CEQ guidance indicated and the courts held
that an agency could, if it so desired, supplement an EIS in order to
consider important project changes or significant new information. 29 Some
agencies even went so far as to impose an obligation upon themselves to
produce a supplement, 294 a duty which the courts did not hesitate to
enforce. 295 In 1978, however, CEQ removed the matter from the discretion
of individual agencies and mandated the preparation of supplemental EISs
in certain specific cases. 296
The CEQ regulations require a supplement in two situations: first, where
an agency has made "substantial changes in the proposed action" which
are relevant to its environmental impact,297 and, second, where "[there are
significant new circumstances or information" concerning the environmental
aspects of a project. 29 As a general matter, agencies must prepare, circulate
for comment, and file a supplement in the same manner as a draft and
291. See Association Concerned About Tomorrow, Inc. v. Dole, 610 F. Supp. 1101, 1108
(N.D. Tex. 1985); Note, supra note 265, at 228; Comment, Supplements to Environmental
Impact Statements: Implementation of the Standards Set by the Council on Environmental
Quality, 35 ME. L. REv. 111, 116 (1983).
292. See Comment, supra note 280, at 10,153. On the other hand, the agency staff which
actually prepares an EIS may have been using it as a vehicle to encourage the final decision-
maker to adopt a more environmentally sensitive approach to a particular project. However,
such efforts, may prove entirely, or at least partially, fruitless.
293. See CEQ 1973 Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.11(b) (1974) (stating that agencies "may
at any time supplement" an EIS, "particularly when substantial changes are made in the
proposed action, or significant new information becomes available concerning its environmental
aspects"); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 91-92 (2d Cir.
1975) (holding that use of a supplemental impact statement "is permissible . . . to consider
changes in the proposed federal action").
294. See, e.g., Federal Highway Administration NEPA Regulations, 23 C.F.R. § 771.15
(1975) (declaring that "[S]upplements will be necessary when substantial changes are made in
the proposed action that will introduce a new or changed environmental effect of significance
. . . or significant new information becomes available.").
295. See Essex County Preservation Ass'n v. Campbell, 536 F.2d 956, 960-61 (lst Cir. 1976)
(enforcing the NEPA regulations of the Federal Highway Administration).
296. See 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,995 (1978); Comment, supra note 291, at 116.
297. CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i) (1987).
298. Id. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii). An agency "may" also prepare a supplement whenever it would
further the purposes of NEPA. Id. § 1502.9(c)(2).
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final EIS.29 In addition to this binding regulatory requirement, the duty to
prepare a supplement also arises from the language of NEPA itself. The
Fifth Circuit, for example, has relied upon the fact that project changes,
in and of themselves, may amount to "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment." ' 0' Therefore, a supple-
mental EIS is triggered by reference to the same standard of "significance"
which is employed to determine whether an EIS is needed in the first
place. 301
Although CEQ and a few courts have used different terms to describe
the scope of changes which will trigger a duty to supplement, the courts
have generally equated "substantial" with "significant. ' 302 In any event,
the agencies possess the initial responsibility to apply the test and decide
whether a supplemental EIS should be written. 3 3 Since such an administra-
tive determination is similar to the threshold question of whether to prepare
an EIS or not, the reviewing courts have generally employed the same
standards of review.3' 4 Thus, a number of circuits apply a reasonableness
test to determine whether or not an agency has erred, 305 while others apply
the familiar arbitrary and capricious standard of review.30 6
299. Id. § 1502.9(c)(4).
300. Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting
NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982)). Most courts that have considered this
matter, however, have found no need to go beyond the CEQ regulations in order to find a
duty to supplement. See, e.g., Enos. v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985); Massa-
chusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 948 (1st Cir. 1983); Friends of the River v. FERC, 720 F.2d
93, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
301. See Environmental Defense Fund, 651 F.2d at 991.
302. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 630 F. Supp. 1215, 1229-30 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (essentially
equating substantial with significant), rev'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1987);
National Indian Youth Council v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 649, 662 (D.N.M. 1980) (holding that
"substantial change" is consistent with "significant change"), aff'd sub nom. National Indian
Youth Council v. Watt, 664 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1981). But cf. Environmental Defense Fund,
651 F.2d at 988 n.4 (suggesting that "substantial changes" could "be interpreted to impose a
more rigorous standard" than "significant").
303. See Friends of the River, 720 F.2d at 108-09; Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1037 (2d Cir. 1983); Environmental Defense Fund, 651 F.2d at 992.
304. See, e.g., Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir.
1980); Monarch Chemical Works v. Thone, 604 F.2d 1083, 1087-88 (8th Cir. 1979).
305. See Environmental Defense Fund, 651 F.2d at 992; Monarch Chemical Works, 604
F.2d at 1087-88; Warm Springs Dam Task Force, 621 F.2d at 1024; National Indian Youth
Council, 501 F. Supp. at 661 (citing Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484
F.2d 1244, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 1973) (initial EIS case)). Although the First Circuit will reverse
an agency's failure to prepare an EIS only if arbitrary or capricious, see Grazing Fields Farm,
626 F.2d at 1072, the Circuit has used the reasonableness test with regard to supplemental
EISs, see Watt, 716 F.2d at 948.
306. See United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d at 1037 (citing Hanly v. Kleindienst,
471 F.2d 823, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying the arbitrary and capricious test to the initial
determination not to prepare an EIS), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973)); Wisconsin v.
Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1984).
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This general conflict has been viewed by some as merely a matter of
semantics, having little practical effect.1 7 The courts which have adopted
the "reasonableness" standard, however, view it as a stringent test designed
to ensure that this crucial agency decision is not "too well shielded from
impartial review." 08o On the other hand, courts choosing the arbitrary and
capricious test have stressed that the use of a more deferential standard will
permit the agencies to apply their expertise in a more flexible fashion.3a 9
Regardless of which standard of review is used31° and whether that choice
really matters, a plaintiff must still try to show that a project change is
significant or substantial enough to merit a supplemental EIS. Such efforts
have met with rather mixed results31" ' and growing judicial hostility. The
Fifth Circuit, for example, held that a fifty-percent increase in the land
necessary for the construction of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway was
significant.3 12 By contrast, the Fifth Circuit held in the same case that the
excavation and disposal of an additional nine million cubic yards of spoil
was not significant because it represented only a 3.5% increase over origi-
nally projected figures.13 The court thus apparently measured significance
not by assessing the independent environmental impact of the project change,
but rather by examining the change in relationship to the entire project. 14
307. See Peshlakai v. Duncan, 13 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1721, 1722 n.12 (D.D.C. 1979)
(initial EIS case); cf. Manasota-88, Inc. v. Thomas, 799 F.2d 687, 692 n.8 (11th Cir. 1986)
(initial EIS case) (stating that the differences between the two standards "are often difficult
to discern"); River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army, 764 F.2d
445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985) (initial EIS case) (expressing doubt as to "how much, if any practical
difference there is between 'abuse of discretion' and 'unreasonable'), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1055 (1986).
308. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973) (initial EIS case).
See also National Indian Youth Council, 501 F. Supp. at 667.
309. See Hanly, 471 F.2d at 829-30.
310. The Supreme Court recently refused to take advantage of two opportunities to resolve
this conflict in the context of administrative decisions not to prepare an EIS in the first
instance. See River Road Alliance, 475 U.S. 1055, 1055-56 (White, J., dissenting from denial
of a petition for certiorari); Gee v. Boyd, 471 U.S. 1058, 1058-60 (1985) (White, J., joined
by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of a petition for certiorari).
311. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 9, at § 10:43 (Supp. 1988).
312. Environmental Defense Fund, 651 F.2d at 993 (overturning the Corps of Engineers'
decision not to supplement as unreasonable). For another project change which a court has
deemed significant, see Association Concerned About Tomorrow, Inc. v. Dole, 610 F. Supp.
1101, 1112-13 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (holding that the shift of a federally funded highway into
public park land containing unique vegetation is significant).
313. Environmental Defense Fund, 651 F.2d at 996 and at n.15. A number of other courts
have found various project modifications too minor to warrant supplementation. See, e.g.,
Monarch Chemical Works, 604 F.2d at 1088-91 (upholding an agency determination that the
siting of a prison in a redevelopment area originally slated for industrial use was not a
significant change); National Indian Youth Council, 501 F. Supp. at 662-63 (upholding an
agency finding that the revision of a mining -plan was not substantial).
314. Such a "relative view" was appropriate, according to the Fifth Circuit, because
otherwise "projections for a large project like the [Tenn-Tom] would need to have an impossible
kind of pinpoint accuracy in order to avoid the need for constant supplementation of the
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Therefore, the larger the project is, the larger so-called "insignificant"
changes can be.
The Seventh Circuit has clearly embraced this form of analysis. In
Wisconsin v. Weinberger,3 5 the court stated that a crucial "difference
between an agency's decision whether to file an initial EIS and its decision
whether to supplement an EIS is that the decision to supplement is made
in light of an already existing, in-depth review of the likely environmental
consequences .... .116 Consequently, an agency must consider "the extent
to which the new information presents a picture of the likely environmental
consequences associated with the proposed action not envisioned by the
original EIS. ' 317 The court then held that in the Seventh Circuit, the test
for a supplemental EIS is whether the current project is "seriously different"
from the original. 31
While the Fifth Circuit has expressly adopted the Seventh Circuit's ap-
proach, 3 9 it is unclear whether Wisconsin v. Weinberger is a harbinger of
a general trend to view supplemental EIS cases with something of a jaundiced
eye. 312 In any case, a NEPA plaintiff may face yet another pitfall in the
quest for a supplemental statement.
Since a citizen will often experience difficulty in determining whether a
project has been modified until such changes appear in concrete form, many
projects will be completed or nearly completed before suit can be filed.12 1
EIS." Environmental Defense Fund, 651 F.2d at 996 n.15. The court, however, did not apply
this "relative" or comparative form of analysis while evaluating two other significant departures
from the original design for the Tenn-Tom. See id. at 993-95 (holding that the flooding of an
additional 5,000 acres and the waterlogging of an additional 50,000 acres were significant
changes); id. at 995 (holding that the isolation of 21 miles of the Tombigbee River due to
new cutoffs of the river's channel was significant).
For a general discussion of Environmental Defense Fund, see Comment, Supplemental EIS
Mandated for Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,213
(1981).
315. 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984).
316. Id. at 418.
317. Id. (emphasis added).
318. Id. (emphasis in original) (finding the Navy's decision not to produce a supplemental
EIS neither arbitrary nor capricious). Although the Seventh Circuit was concerned in this case
specifically about the significance of new information rather than project modifications, the
court's analysis is sufficiently broad to apply to cases involving project changes as well.
319. See Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding
unreasonable the Army Corps of Engineers' refusal to supplement an EIS in light of new
information).
320. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 9, at § 10:43 (Supp. 1988) (characterizing Weinberger
as adopting a "restrictive view" which "is not yet the definitive word" on the subject).
. 321. See supra text accompanying notes 287-88. Ogunquit Village, 553 F.2d 243, provides
an excellent illustration of this problem.
The Village of Ogunquit, Maine, had long thrived on tourists who came to enjoy the white
sand dunes which stretched along that portion of the Maine coast. Unfortunately, the dunes
began to erode, prompting the village to seek assistance from the federal Soil Conservation
Service. The Service, in turn, proposed to rebuild the dunes and prepared an EIS. See id. at
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If so, a court may well deny post-completion relief, finding the suit moot322
or barred by laches. 323
Even if a plaintiff could surmount the obstacles of discovering a project
change before it is too late and convincing a court that an agency erred in
deeming a change insignificant, victory may prove hollow. A supplemental
EIS will not necessarily lead to a different, more environmentally sensitive
decision. Indeed, it is not unlikely that the affected agency will produce a
supplement which is just more closely attuned to the agency's prior decision.
In such a case, the supplement may become a mere post hoc rationalization
designed to justify what amounts to a fait accompli.32 The preparation of
a supplemental impact statement, nevertheless, will provide EPA and other
commenting federal agencies with an opportunity to refer proposed actions
which now, more accurately depicted in the supplement, appear environ-
mentally unsatisfactory. The route by which such a referral becomes pos-
sible, however, is tremendously circuitous, fraught with delay, and wasteful
of limited public resources. Moreover, only a relative handful of projects
will ever result in court-ordered supplementation-. 25 Consequently, a more
243-44. Although the EIS implied that white quartz sand would be used during the restoration
process, see id. at 245, the Service found it necessary to use substantial amounts of coarse
yellow sand and gravel. This mixture was dumped in December of 1974, and the project was
completely wrapped up within a month. By the time the village complained, it was too late;
the damage had been done. See id. at 244. Instead of the famous white sand dunes, "the
villagers found what to many was an ugly yellow bunker." Id.
Faced with the dilemma of a completed project and an EIS which now appeared inadequate,
and fearful of an avalanche of retrospective NEPA litigation, the First Circuit held that post-
completion relief was unavailable unless bad faith could be demonstrated. Id. at 245-46. For
criticism of the First Circuit's approach, see Note, supra note 265; Note, Ogunquit Village
Corp. v. Davis and Judicial Relief under the National Environmental Policy Act: The
Completed Project Problem, 64 VA. L. REv. 629 (1978).
322. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. A supplemental EIS could, nevertheless,
identify various inexpensive ways to mitigate the harm caused by some project changes. See
Note, supra note 265, at 234-35; Note, supra note 321, at 639.
323. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
324. Many plaintiffs, on the other hand, may be quite content to delay the completion of
a project in hopes that the agency will grow frustrated and drop it, that Congress will eventually
withdraw funding, or that a new administration will choose to discontinue that particular
project. Delay, however, does not invariably flow from a court order requiring the supple-
mentation of an EIS.
A number of courts have chosen to balance the competing public interests in deciding
whether to enjoin further construction pending completion of a supplement. See Watt, 716
F.2d at 952-53; Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 425-28; see generally Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305 (1982) (holding that a court has discretion in determining whether it will fashion
injunctive relief to cure a Clean Water Act violation). But see Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark,
747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that "[I]rreparable damage is presumed when an
agency fails to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a prop9sed action").
325. The value of voluntary compliance with the supplementation requirements found in
the CEQ regulations is not intended to be gainsaid. In fact, most agencies probably try to
comply in more instances than not. This article, however, is primarily concerned with the
absence of an effective external safeguard that will serve to ensure that agencies of the executive
branch do not ignore the environmental harm that their actual decisions may cause.
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direct and comprehensive mechanism must be employed if agencies are to
be held accountable for the environmental consequences of their decisions
and subsequent actions.
IV. A NEw APPROACH TO EXECuTIVE BRANCH OVERSIGHT
Congress confronted a unique problem in drafting NEPA. Rather than
crafting a piece of legislation dealing with a specific regulatory subject, such
as air quality or water pollution control, Congress attempted to reorient
the priorities of the entire executive branch in order to protect the environ-
ment. Consequently, NEPA's statement of substantive policy is exceedingly
general,126 applying as it must to thousands of diverse situations arising in
dozens of different agencies. Congress, moreover, had to take into account
a multitude of existing, sometimes countervailing, policies which also serve
vital national interests. Section 101 thus provides that environmental pro-
tection is not necessarily the controlling factor in federal decisionmaking.
Instead, agencies are instructed "to use all practicable means, consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy" to carry out NEPA's
substantive mandate to enhance and preserve the quality of the human
environment.3 27
Statements of policy, however, are generally ineffective tools for achieving
administrative reform.as Even less effective would be a statement, necessarily
broad, which contains language authorizing federal decisionmakers to bal-
ance a number of competing policy concerns-one of which is potentially
at odds with the historic missions of many developmentally-minded agencies.
It is fortunate, therefore, that Congress strove over a number of months
to construct a cohesive body of procedural and structural reforms329 designed
to ensure the implementation of the policy goals established by NEPA.
The primary procedural vehicle which Congress seized upon to place
principle in action was the EIS. Through this device, Congress tried to
guarantee that agencies would at least examine the environmental harm that
major federal actions would cause. So informed, it was Congress' hope that
agencies would modify their activities to avoid unnecessary environmental
damage.330 Congress, nevertheless, was prudent enough not to rely totally
upon this procedural device as a means to achieve substantive reform. After
all, merely forcing an agency to think differently about a problem will not
326. See supra text accompanying note 4.
327. NEPA § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1982).
328. See supra note 5.
329. See McGarity, supra note 213, at 257 (using the narrower term "structural regulatory
reform" to describe attempts to alter "agency decisionmaking structures so that different
institutional actors play greater or lesser roles" (emphasis in original)).
330. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76, 85-87, 122-26.
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necessarily lead that agency to change its customary institutional behavior.
Congress thus worked hard, albeit in a series of fits and starts, to create a
structural setting in which other executive agencies-more environmentally
concerned agencies-could participate in the environmental assessment and
decisionmaking processes.
NEPA's creation of a high-level CEQ was a significant step in laying the
foundation for this kind of structural reform. CEQ, however, was not
originally conceived as a vigorous, hands-on advocate for the goals expressed
in NEPA. In fact, Congress, in enacting NEPA, envisioned CEQ's oversight
role as rather minimal. Despite the fact that a number of Representatives
believed that CEQ could serve as a watchdog for environmental concerns
within the administration, 33' the Senate Report, and the subsequent state-
ments by the bill's two primary sponsors, indicate that CEQ's oversight
function was limited to reviewing the general trend of federal activities in
order to advise the President on matters of broad environmental concern.332
NEPA, however, did give environmental agencies a voice in the impact
assessment process. This was accomplished by revising section 102(2)(C) in
two ways. In addition to changing the requirement for a "finding" to the
now familiar requirement of a "detailed statement, 3 33 Congress directed
action agencies to request comments on their detailed statements from those
agencies with environmental expertise or jurisdiction.3 34 Although Senator
Muskie exaggerated when he claimed that these revisions would place the
ultimate authority to determine environmental effects in the hands of
environmental agencies,33 5 Congress did deprive action agencies of the ability
to make environmental findings in a virtual vacuum, insulated from external
advice and scrutiny. The final version of section 102(2)(C), therefore, opened
up the assessment process and created a structural check upon any agency
inclined to ignore or minimize significant environmental problems during
the preparation of an impact statement.
Within the course of a year, Congress found that this check was not
totally adequate. The voice of environmental agencies had proved neither
331. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Even Senator Jackson thought that the
location of CEQ in the Executive Office of the President would provide an effective check on
the views of the mission-oriented agencies. See supra text accompanying note 81. His later
statements indicate, however, that this check would be limited to overseeing the "general
direction" of federal programs and offering broad policy advice. See supra note 128.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90; supra note 128 (views of Sen. Jackson and
Rep. Dingell). The responsibility for reviewing day-to-day decisionmaking, as well as the
resolution of inter-agency disputes, therefore, was relegated by default to the Bureau of the
Budget, a cabinet-level council, or the President. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 113-18, 130 and accompanying text.
334. See id. (Sen. Muskie commented, "The requirement that ...comments accompany
any such report would place the environmental control responsibility where it should be." 115
CONG. Rac. 29,053 (1969).
335. See supra text accompanying note 131.
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loud enough nor effective enough to inform the assessment process and
thereby influence agency decisionmaking.33 6 Congress, consequently, took
strong action to amplify executive branch oversight when it enacted section
309 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. Section 309 not only
compels EPA to monitor and comment on the merits of all major federal
actions having significant environmental implications,33 7 it provides EPA
with the authority to refer any such "action" which is environmentally
"unsatisfactory" to a higher authority-CEQ-for review and possible
resolution.33 Such a brief description of section 309, however, fails to
convey the sweeping form of executive branch oversight for which this short
but remarkable provision calls.
The original Senate version of section 309 would have focused EPA
review merely upon the environmental merits of impact statements and the
proposed actions such statements describe. 3 9 The conference, however,
changed this language, instructing EPA instead to review and comment on
the substantive merits of "any major Federal agency action" subject to the
required preparation of an impact statement.3 4 By adopting the conference
version of section 309, Congress must have intended to broaden the scope
of EPA's oversight authority to include the environmental rectitude of final
agency action, not just the adequacy of an impact statement or even the
environmental quality of a proposed action described in an EIS. 341 Likewise,
336. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49. See also supra notes 170-72 and accompa-
nying text.
337. See Clean Air Act § 309(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (1982).
338. Id. § 309(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7609(b).
339. See supra text accompanying notes 141-48 and note 149 and accompanying text..
340. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 36 (1970) (§ 309(a)), reprinted
in 1 LEGISLATV E HiSToRY 1970, supra note 20, at 186. See also supra text accompanying notes
162-63, 178 and note 165 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 173-75 (comments of Sen. Muskie on the policy underlying § 309). If
Congress had wished to expressly limit EPA review under § 309 to proposed actions for which
an EIS must be prepared, it certainly knew how to do so. For instance, § 309 specifically
limits EPA review of agency regulations to "proposed regulations." Clean Air Act § 309(a),
42 U.S.C. § 7609(a). Congress, therefore, apparently chose to extend EPA review beyond the
narrow confines of proposals which trigger an EIS or proposals which are found in the text
of an EIS.
A number of commentators, however, have assumed that § 309 NEPA review is limited to
the merits of proposed action. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 24, at 268; Healy, supra note
149, at 50,080 n.62. This view, however, appears to be based, at least in part, upon a mistaken
reading of the provision's legislative history. Both Healy and Anderson state that the Senate
bill had restricted EPA review to the procedural adequacy of impact statements. See supra
note 149. Therefore, they see the significance of the conference action as involving a shift
from a procedural review to a substantive evaluation of an EIS. See Anderson, supra note
24, at 268; Healy, supra note 149, at 50,080 n.62. This explanation thus falls to account for
the action of the conference if, as this article argues, the Senate bill had already mandated
substantive scrutiny of environmental impact statements.
One could, nevertheless, make a plausible argument for limiting § 309 review to the merits
of proposed agency action. After all, that section requires EPA to review and comment on
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and with identical effect, Congress accepted the conference language re-
quiring EPA to refer to CEQ any such action found wanting on environ-
mental grounds. 342
Congress was, therefore, determined to create a strong day-to-day super-
visor of the manner in which federal agencies comply with the requirements
of the NEPA process and the Act's underlying policy goals. In fact, the
legislative history indicates that EPA was expected to perform its important,
though politically unenviable, task by vigorously advocating the case against
those federal activities that present the risk of untoward environmental
consequences. 343 Congress also enhanced EPA's bargaining position within
the administration by recognizing the unique role that CEQ could play if
EPA found itself at an impasse with another agency. In such a case, EPA
is not only empowered but expected to refer the matter to CEQ if the
action is unsatisfactory from an environmental standpoint. 344 CEQ, in turn,
can bring to bear the not inconsiderable weight and prestige that its position
in the Executive Office of the President can command.34
The full potential of section 309, however, has yet to be realized.
Conceived of as a comprehensive mechanism for achieving structural reform
in federal decisionmaking, it has suffered the fate of a relatively obscure
piece of legislation. CEQ, of course, has acknowledged that the purpose of
the EIS is to produce better decisions.3a To this end, CEQ requires agencies
to produce a ROD which indicates to some extent how an impact statement
was used in the decisionmaking process.3 47 CEQ also directs agencies to
abide by the mitigation measures and other conditions found in this decision
document. 34 However, CEQ has failed to establish an oversight mechanism
"any major Federal agency action . . . to which section [102(2)(C) of NEPA] applies," Clean
Air Act § 309(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a), and § 102(2)(C) applies, in a literal sense, to "proposals"
for "major Federal actions" having significant environmental effects. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). Such a reading of § 309, however, is not the most reasonable
interpretation of Congress' intent as revealed by the action of the conference and the words
of Senator Muskie. Moreover, the ultimate action to which § 102(2)(C) applies is final agency
action. That is the action which the impact statement is designed to inform, see Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and that is the
action which may not proceed until an impact statement has been prepared, CEQ Regulations,
40 C.F.R. §§ 1506.1, 1506.11(b) (1987); CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11(b) (1987).
342. See supra text accompanying note 164.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75. Professor William H. Rodgers, Jr. has aptly
described § 309 as giving EPA "a roving commission to review [federal activities]." W.
RODGERS, supra note 160, at 219. It "makes EPA 'a general environmental busybody and
gossip' with a duty to question "unsuitable environmental adventures." Id. at 709.
344. See Clean Air Act § 309(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7609(b) (stating that EPA "shall" refer such
"unsatisfactory" actions to CEQ).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 199-201, 248-56.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 216-18, and note 228 and accompanying text.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 219-26.
348. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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which would ensure that these procedural requirements serve their intended
purpose of encouraging better decisions and actions.
Under CEQ's leadership, the entire referral process has been confined to
disputes concerning the environmental assessment process.149 While CEQ
does permit referrals based on the merits of the proposed actions found in
EISs,350 both the Council's regulations"' and experience 35 2 demonstrate that
an agency can modify or even ignore that proposal when it comes to final
decisionmaking. CEQ, however, does not appear to be authorized to prohibit
referrals emanating from EPA as to the substantive merits of agency
decisions or actions. Section 309 authorizes such referrals, 353 and Executive
Order 11,991 certainly ordered CEQ to promulgate regulations implementing
section 309. 354 Nevertheless, CEQ has in effect prohibited the filing of such
referrals .355
CEQ has not articulated any rationale for its truncated approach to
entertaining environmental referrals from EPA.35 6 EPA, on the other hand,
has long recognized that its oversight role does not necessarily end with the
filing of an impact statement. 3 7 The agency's practice in this regard,
however, suffers from both internal and external constraints. Rather than
broadly examining the environmental merits of federal decisionmaking and
the actions that follow, EPA's post-EIS procedures have concentrated upon
the relatively narrow question of whether an agency has complied with its
mitigation agreement, if any, with EPA. 3 8 Furthermore, even within this
limited context, EPA's ability to influence another agency is severely ham-
pered because EPA lacks the formal recourse of a post-EIS referral to
CEQ.359
Neither CEQ nor EPA, therefore, have taken all of the steps necessary
to tie the procedural requirements of NEPA to its ultimate goal of better
decisionmaking. While section 309 does not authorize either EPA or CEQ
to veto another agency's final decision, it does provide for a broadening of
the traditional decisionmaking processes of the federal government to allow
EPA and, in certain instances, CEQ to inject their thoughts on how agencies
can better serve national environmental policy. Such a structural reform
was altogether appropriate since NEPA's policy does not demand precise
349. See supra notes 235-37, 257 and accompanying text.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 232-33.
351. See supra notes 219-26, 258 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 162-65, 173-78, 337-43.
354. See supra note 214.
355. See supra note 257.
356. See Preamble to CEQ Regulations, supra note 35; CEQ Forty Most Asked Questions,
supra note 34.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 211-12, 261-64.
358. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 257-58.
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results. Given the flexibility and generality with which NEPA's policy is
stated, the Act's goal of more environmentally sensitive decisionmaking
could easily be subordinated to the more immediate goals of mission-oriented
agencies.
At the same time, however, Congress did not intend to dislodge the
discretion that agencies have to make final decisions. NEPA essentially
counsels prudence, asking an agency to balance environmental concerns
with other essential considerations of national policy. The judiciary is thus
ill-equipped and likely not empowered to supervise this aspect of the
decisionmaking process. In contrast, Congress did tap EPA to be the
environmental gadfly of the federal government. In this role, EPA can-
indeed must-criticize agency decisions or actions which fail to comport
with the environmental values recognized in NEPA. If the informal give-
and-take between EPA and another agency does not resolve a particular
dispute, EPA then must, if the action appears unsatisfactory, refer the
question to CEQ.
Congress was wise to provide for CEQ review and intervention in such
situations. As the President's direct representative, CEQ possesses the unique
ability not only to mediate serious policy disputes, but to influence agency
decisionmaking. In fact, CEQ has direct access, at least theoretically, to
both the President and his immediate staff. Aside from Congress itself,
CEQ may well be the most appropriate institution to assist in reconciling
conflicts between NEPA and other statutory missions. Moreover, the pub-
licity generated by formal referrals may, on occasion, prompt direct con-
gressional intervention. In those instances, Congress itself can decide upon
the course of action which will best serve the national interest.
The implementation of this comprehensive structural reform still awaits
administrative action. CEQ thus should amend its NEPA regulations to
require agencies to provide EPA with copies of all RODs. Such decision
documents, moreover, should delineate the agency's decision in sufficient
detail to allow EPA to appraise its merits from an environmental stand-
point.w6° EPA should also be given an appropriate period of time in which
to review these documents, consult with the originating agencies, and, if
necessary, refer a decision to CEQ.
During this review period, agencies should be prohibited from taking any
action, such as licensing or construction activities which would compromise
an agency's ability to alter its decision. Such a timing provision will likely
be criticized because it extends the NEPA review process and will result in
some additional delay. This delay, however, is a small price to pay for an
institutional arrangement designed to ensure that final agency action is
360. In the event the terms of a decision are adequately described in the impact statement
itself, an agency should be free to incorporate the relevant portions of the EIS by reference.
[Vol. 64:205
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
indeed geared to what was learned during the preparation of an EIS. To
minimize any possible disruption to agency programs, CEQ should require
relatively prompt review by EPA and also provide for the expeditious
resolution of any referrals which EPA might file.
Decisions, however, no matter how wise they may be, must still be
implemented. Agencies, therefore, should be directed to undertake a rea-
sonable self-monitoring program which will identify the extent to which the
agency's action has been faithful to the terms of the ROD. The resulting
information, furthermore, must be made available to EPA for its review
and comment. In the event that the agency's actions deviate from the ROD
and as a result seriously compromise environmental values, EPA should be
authorized to refer the matter to CEQ for further review.
The efficacy of implementation referrals will depend on whether a par-
ticular deficiency or omission can be corrected. The earlier a problem
surfaces, of course, the more likely a practical remedy can be found.
However, certain omissions can be corrected even after significant aspects
of a project have been completed. While the construction of a dam cannot
be undone, the acquisition of wetlands or wildlife habitat can still be
undertaken. If funding is the problem, a referral to the Executive Office
of the President may well spur the administration to seek whatever additional
funding may be necessary to implement necessary mitigation.
EPA should also take steps to complement these regulatory changes. The
agency should revise its policy and procedures to guarantee that appropriate
review and comment will take place during the various stages of the post-
EIS oversight process. EPA should also define its approach to consultation
and negotiation with the relevant agencies prior to any referral. In addition,
EPA should set forth, in general, the circumstances under which it will
pursue a referral to CEQ.
None of these reforms, however, will succeed unless CEQ and EPA
request and receive additional funding and staff to initiate this expanded
form of environmental oversight. The prospect of such a request from the
Reagan administration was dismal. During the Reagan years, in fact, the
entire professional staff at CEQ dwindled to five persons.3 1' The current
administration, on the other hand, will have an opportunity to establish a
renewed commitment to environmental quality. If it wishes to pursue this
commitment through vigorous executive branch scrutiny of the way in which
361. See Budget Hearings 1988, supra note 242, at 705 (setting forth the actual staffing
figures for fiscal year 1987). The entire staff (professional as well as clerical, but excluding
Council members) has fallen from a total of 49 in 1979, see Department of Housing and
Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1981, Pt. 6: Hearings Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1007 (1980)
(setting forth average employment for fiscal year 1979), to nine in 1987, Budget Hearings
1988, supra note 242, at 705. See generally National Journal, May 18, 1985, at 1103 (describing
CEQ as "an early target of the Reagan budget ax and personnel cuts").
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the federal bureaucracy implements NEPA, it will seek both the necessary
funds and personnel from Congress. The question will then be back in the
forum from whence section 309 sprang.
CONCLUSION
NEPA is an ambitious statute. It cautions prudence and wisdom in the
way federal agencies approach actions which may compromise the integrity
of the environment. After calling upon agencies to fully inform themselves
about the environmental consequences of proposed actions, the Act instructs
agencies to craft decisions which are as responsive as possible to the demands
of environmental quality. NEPA, consequently, creates a comprehensive,
but flexible mechanism for achieving its goal of more enlightened federal
decisionmaking. Rather than mandating specific answers to specific prob-
lems, NEPA relies upon the efforts of every federal agency to weigh
competing policy demands in an environmentally informed and sensitive
fashion.
By placing the primary responsibility for implementing NEPA in the
hands of mission-oriented agencies, Congress recognized that the most
effective and practical avenue for influencing agency action lies in the
internalization of the values expressed in NEPA. Congress, however, was
also perceptive enough to realize that not all of these agencies would be
especially receptive to such a new responsibility. This realization led Congress
to devise a number of structural safeguards designed to ensure that agencies
make informed choices which reflect the high objectives of the Act.
The first such structural safeguard is found in the text of NEPA itself.
It invites agencies which possess special environmental competence to par-
ticipate in the impact assessment process. Through this participation, action
agencies receive advice and criticism on both the technical adequacy of
impact statements and the substantive merits of proposed actions. CEQ,
moreover, has provided an additional safeguard in the event these agencies
find themselves at loggerheads over substantive matters. If the action
proposed in a final statement is found environmentally wanting, an envi-
ronmental agency may refer the question to CEQ for high-level executive
branch review.
The NEPA process, however, does not end with preparation of a satis-
factory impact statement. NEPA requires more than just the production of
paperwork, even excellent paperwork. It requires an action agency to come
to terms with what was learned in an EIS, to balance competing policy
interests, and to make a decision which, to the extent possible, furthers the
goal of environmental protection. While Congress never preempted the
decisionmaking authority of action agencies, it did establish an additional
structure-section 309 of the Clean Air Act-that would subject such
decisions to executive branch oversight.
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Through section 309, Congress directed the EPA to maintain constant
watch over those actions of its sister agencies which present a risk of
significant environmental harm. EPA's obligations under section 309, there-
fore, extend beyond the mere monitoring of the actions proposed in final
impact statements. In fact, EPA's charge extends to the environmental
merits of final agency decisions. Congress thus envisioned a broad oversight
role for EPA, a role strengthened by the availability of a referral to CEQ
in the event an agency decision appears to be environmentally unsatisfactory.
The full potential of this reform, however, remains untapped. EPA largely
limits its oversight function to the assessment phase of the NEPA process.
And CEQ, for its part, refuses to entertain referrals which challenge the
substantive merits of final agency decisions. Hence, no real structural
safeguard currently exists that would encourage agencies to either take their
impact statements seriously or adhere to the policy objectives of NEPA
during the formulation of final decisions.
Contrary to congressional expectations, therefore, agencies are effectively
insulated from external scrutiny during the most critical phase of the NEPA
process. Such insulation does nothing to promote the internalization of
environmental values or responsibility. Such insulation, moreover, makes it
all too easy for agencies, even well-intentioned agencies, to succumb to the
ever-present temptation to subordinate the aspiring goals of NEPA to more
parochial concerns. Fortunately, Congress has already devised a structure
to pierce this insulation. All that remains is for CEQ and EPA to summon
the political courage and will to implement that structure and for Congress
to appropriate the necessary funds. If they do, a significant step will have
been taken toward ensuring that the promise of NEPA is not lost amid the
pressures and complexities of modern administrative decisionmaking.
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